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UNION SECURITY AGREEMENTS IN
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
Patricia N. Blairt
The number of employees on the public payroll has more than
doubled in the past two decades.' Public employee union member-
ship has exhibited a commensurate growth record. 2 The recogni-
tion by federal and state governments of the right of public
employees to bargain collectively has increased correspondingly.
Although such uniform national legislation as the 1935 National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)3 and the Railway Labor Act of 1926
(RLA),4 which guarantee the right to bargain collectively in the
private sector, has no counterpart in the area of public employ-
ment, both the federal government and a substantial majority of
the states have acted to secure collective bargaining rights for their
respective public employees.
At the federal level, Executive Order Number 11,4915 and the
Postal Reorganization Act of 19706 guarantee United States
employees7 the right to bargain collectively. Thirty-six states8 also
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B.S. 1965, J.D. 1968, Indiana University School of Law; LL.M. 1969, University of Michigan
School of Law. This article was submitted by the author in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the S.J.D. degree, University of Michigan School of Law.
The author wishes to thank Professor LeRoy L. Lamborn, a good friend and colleague,
for his editorial assistance on the manuscript of this Article.
I U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 433 (94th ed. 1973).
2 For a discussion of this growth in public employment and in public employee union
membership, as well as a discussion of the development of collective bargaining in the public
service, see Blair, State Legislative Control over the Conditions of Public Employment: Defining the
Scope of Collective Bargaining for State and Municipal Employees, 26 VAND. L. REv. 1-8 (1973).
3 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
4 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1970).
5 3 C.F.R. 191 (Comp. 1969), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970), as amended, 3 C.F.R. 254 (1974).
Executive Order Number 11,491 superseded Executive Order Number 10,988 (3 C.F.R. 521
(Comp. 1959-1963), 5 U.S.C. § 631 (1964)), issued by President John F. Kennedy on January
17, 1962, which first extended the right to bargain collectively to federal employees.
6 39 U.S.C. §§ 1201-09 (1970).
7 Executive Order Number 11,491 applies only to employees in the executive branch of
the federal government.
8 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 37, § 450(3) (Cum. Supp. 1973) (firemen); ALASKA STAT.
§ 14.20.560 (1971) (teachers); id. § 23.40.070 (1972) (public employees generally); CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 13082 (West 1969) (teachers); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3505 (West Supp. 1974)
(municipal employees); id. § 3525 (state employees); CAL. LABOR CODE § 1962 (West 1971)
(firemen); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 70120 (West 1973) (transit workers); CONN. GE. STAT.
REv. § 7-468 (1972) (municipal employees); id. § I0-I53(d) (teachers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2,
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have enacted legislation permitting or mandating collective bar-
gaining in the public sector. These laws vary considerably in scope
from comprehensive, NLRA-type statutes to statutes which merely
authorize collective bargaining by public employees.9
For states enacting collective bargaining legislation, the NLRA
serves as a useful model. 10 That Act broadly defines the scope of
§ 1613 (Cum. Supp. 1970); id. tit. 19, § 802 (transportation workers); id. § 1302 (public
employees generally); id. tit. 14, § 4001 (public school employees); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 447.20-.35 (Supp. 1974) (firemen); id. § 839.221 (1965) (public employees); HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 89-3 (Supp. 1973) (public employees generally); IDAHO CODE § 44-1802 (Supp.
1973) (firemen); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 328a (Smith-Hurd 1966) (transit workers);
IND. CODE §§ 20-7.5-1-1-7.5-1-14 (Supp. 1974) (teachers); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5414 (1972)
(teachers); id. § 75-4328 (Supp. 1973) (public employees except teachers); KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 78.470 (Supp. 1973) (county policemen); id. § 345.030 (firemen); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 23.890 (Supp. 1973) (transit workers); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965 (1964)
(municipal employees); MD. ANN. CODE art. 64B, § 37(b) (1972) (transit workers); Id. art.
77, § 160 (Supp. 1973) (teachers); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E (Supp. 1973) (all
public employees); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(9) (1968) (public employees); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 179.65 (Supp. 1974) (public employees generally); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.510
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1974) (all public employees except police, deputy sheriffs, and
teachers); MONT. R v. CODES ANN. § 75-6119 (Supp. 1971) (teachers); id. § 59-1604
(Supp. 1974) (all public employees, except public school employees and nurses); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 79-1287 (1971) (teachers); NEv. REv. STAT. § 288.150 (1973) (local government
employees); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:3 (1971) (municipal employees); id. § 98-C:2 (Supp.
1973) (state employees); Id. § 105-B:3 (Supp. 1973) (policemen); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1974) (all public employees); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 203 (McKinney
1973) (all public employees); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-08 (1971) (teachers); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 548.4 (Supp. 1973) (firemen, policemen, and municipal employees); id. tit. 70,
§ 509.2 (1972) (teachers); ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.730 (1971) (all public employees except
teachers); id. § 342.450 (teachers); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.1 (Supp. 1974) (police and
firemen); id. § 1101.401 (all public employees except police, firemen, and transit employees);
id. tit. 53, § 39951 (transit workers); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.1-6 (Supp. 1973) (firemen);
id. § 28-9.2-6 (policemen); id. § 28-9.3-4 (1969) (teachers); id. § 28-9.4-3 (municipal em-
ployees); id. § 36-11-1 (Supp. 1973) (state employees); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 3-18-2
(Supp. 1973) (all public employees); TEx. Riv. Civ. STAT. art. 5154c-1 (Supp. 1974) (firemen
and policemen); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 903 (Supp. 1974) (state employees); i. tit. 16, § 1982
(teachers); id. tit. 21, § 1721 (municipal employees); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.72.030
(1970) (teachers); id. § 41.56.010 (1972) (municipal and state employees); id. § 53.18.020
(Supp. 1974) (port district employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.94(29) (1965) (transit workers);
id. § 111.70(2) (1974) (municipal employees); id. § 111.82 (state employees); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 27-266 (1967) (firemen).
9 As this author noted in a previous article,
[s]ome states have a single statute that either authorizes or requires all state public
employers to engage in collective bargaining. Other states divide their public
employers into categories, such as school boards or fire departments, and by
separate legislation authorize or require each different group to engage in collective
bargaining. Still other states have enacted single public employer collective bargain-
ing acts that authorize or require only a limited group of public employers to
engage in collective bargaining.
Blair, supra note 2, at 3 n. 17. For a discussion of the various kinds of statutes, see id. at 3-5.
10 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-153 (Supp. 1973); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455
(1968); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 200-14 (McKinney 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.401
(Supp. 1974).
PUBLIC SECTOR UNION SECURITY
negotiable subjects as "wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment,"11 a phrase that has been construed in an
expansive manner by both the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) and the courts in cases dealing with private sector indus-
trial relations.1 2 In drafting public employee bargaining laws, state
legislatures must, therefore, confront the problem of determining
the extent to which these laws should permit-or require-public
employees and their employers to bargain collectively over substan-
tially the same subjects now negotiable in the private sector under
the NLRA. One of the most important of these subjects is union
security. Whether union security should be Within the scope of
collective bargaining for public employees has been the subject of
considerable disagreement.1 3
I
UNION SECURITY
As the phrase has come to be defined in the private sector,
"union security" encompasses any agreement between an employer
and a union acting as exclusive bargaining agent that requires
every employee in the bargaining unit, as a condition of employ-
ment, to be a union member or to pay a specified amount to the
union for its bargaining services.14 The five basic forms of union
security that have developed over the years in the private sector are
the closed shop,15 the union shop,1 6 the agency shop, 17 the mainte-
11 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). Once raised at the bargaining table, subjects within this
definition are mandatorily bargainable, which means that the parties must negotiate over
them until an impasse is reached. In the private sector, subjects not within this definition are
negotiable with the mutual consent of labor and management. See NLRB v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
12 E.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); American
Smelting & Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969);
Dolly Madison Indus., 182 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 74 L.R.R.M. 1230 (1970).
3 See, e.g., Address by D. Silvergleid, President of the National Postal Union, to the
Federal Labor Relations Council, Oct. 6, 1970, in 370 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. A-6 (Oct. 12,
1970); notes 28 & 161 infra.
14 See generally R. SMrTH & L. MERRIFIELD, LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 974-79 (5th ed. 1974).
"5 In a closed shop, the employer and union agree that the employer will hire only
union members and that all employees so hired will remain union members as a condition of
employment. See id. at 974.
1" In a union shop, the employer and union agree that all employees must join the
union within a prescribed time after their initial hiring and remain union members as a
condition of employment. See id. at 975.
17 In an agency shop, the employer and union agree that employees are free to refrain
from union membership, but that all nonunion employees must pay to the union an amount
equal to union dues and fees as a condition of employment. See id.
1975]
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nance of membership agreement,1 8 and the fair share agreement.1 9
In the private sector all forms of union security were man-
datorily bargainable under the NLRA until 1947,20 at which time
the Act was amended to prohibit the closed shop 21 because of its
numerous abuses by unions.22 The union shop, agency shop,
maintenance of membership agreement, and fair share agreement
remain mandatorily bargainable, 23 however, although another
amendment introduced into the NLRA in 1947 expressly validates
state legislation prohibiting agreements requiring union member-
ship as a condition of employment. 24 Similarly, although the RLA
Is In a maintenance of membership agreement, the employer and union agree that
employees are free to refrain from union membership, but that employees who elect to join
the union must retain their union membership until the expiration of the collective
agreement, as a condition of employment. See id. at 975-76.
19 In a fair share agreement, the employer and union agree that employees are free to
refrain from union membership, but that all employees must pay the union a prorata share
of bargaining costs as a condition of employment or that union members must pay union
dues and fees, while nonunion members must pay only their prorata share of bargaining
costs. See ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.650(10) (1973).
20 In Public Serv. Co. of Colorado, 89 N.L.R.B. 418 (1950), the NLRB indicated that
the legislative intent of the Wagner Act was to permit any relationship between employer
and employee then allowed under state law-induding the closed shop. See also Algoma
Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301, 307 (1949).
Although these decisions were rendered after the NLRA was amended to prohibit the closed
shop, they were made on the basis of the unamended Act.
21 The 1935 version of the NLRA, known as the Wagner Act (ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449
(1935)), stated: "Provided, That nothing in this Act . . . shall preclude an employer from
making an agreement with a labor organization ... to require as a condition of employment
membership therein." Id. § 8(3). In 1947 Congress enacted the Labor-Management
Relations Act, or Taft-Hartley Act (ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)), which added the following
italicized language to the existing proviso:
Provided, That nothing in this Act... shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization ... to require as a condition of employment
membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employ-
ment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later ....
Id. § 8(a)(3), amending 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1946) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970)).
In NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), the Supreme Court construed that
added language to forbid the dosed shop.
22 In its report on the amendment, the Senate Committee noted:
Numerous examples were presented to the committee of the way union leaders
have used closed-shop devices as a method of depriving employees of their jobs,
and in some cases a means of securing a livelihood in their trade or calling, for
purely capricious reasons.
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947).
23 American Seating Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 800 (1952). See also NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
24 Thus,
[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application
of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is
prohibited by State or Territorial law.
Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 14(b), 61 Stat. 151, amending 29 U.S.C. § 164 (1946)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970)).
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was amended in 1934 to preclude all forms of union security, 25 a
1951 amendment permits bargaining over the same type of union
security provisions that are bargainable under the NLRA. 26 As a
result, eighty percent of the collective agreements negotiated today
pursuant to the NLRA and RLA contain either a union shop,
agency shop, maintenance of membership, or fair share
provision.27
II
THE MERIT PRINCIPLE ARGUMENT
In spite of the acceptance of the principle of union security in
the private sector, various groups vehemently oppose its introduc-
tion into the area of public employment. 28 One argument against
authorizing bargaining in the public sector over union security
devices of the type bargainable under the NLRA and RLA is that
conditioning a person's continued employment on union member-
ship or the payment of a sum of money to a union is contrary to
the merit principle which now prevails in most governments
-federal, state, and local.29 That is, actual or constructive union
membership has no relationship to the employee's successful per-
formance of his job and, therefore, should not be a basis for
discharge.
This argument against the propriety of union security devices
of the type permitted in the private sector evinces a basic misun-
derstanding of the merit principle. The phrase "merit principle" is
simply a popular description for the general notion underlying
legislation, most of which was enacted initially in the early 1900's,
requiring positions in a government's appointive service to be filled
on the basis of an applicant's ability or "merit" and prohibiting a
governmental employer from discharging employees on racial,
religious, or political grounds.3 0 The merit principle is today
25 Act of June 21, 1934, ch. 691, § 2, 48 Stat. 1185, amending Railway Labor Act, ch.
347, § 2, 44 Stat. 577 (codified at 45 U.S.C. 151(a)-52 (1970)).
26 Act of Jan. 10, 1951, ch.. 1220, § 2, 64 Stat. 1238,-amending Railway Labor Act § 2, 45
U.S.C. § 152 (1946) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970)).
27 L. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 194 (4th ed. 1964).
28 See, e.g., Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, Conclusions and Recom-
mendations on Labor Relations, 342 GOV'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP., March 30, 1970, at E-1;
NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK Comm., REPORT: A BASIC AND PREcious RIGHT (1973); W.
VOSLOO, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE (1966).
2s See, e.g., H. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF THE CIVIL SERVICE 331 (1958); TASK FORCE,
REPORT: A POLICY FOR EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE
(1961).
30 Prior to 1883 job appointments in the public sector generally were made on the basis
19751
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merely one component of a larger complex of laws that regulate
various aspects of a government's relations with its employees and
are enforced by a commission operating independently of the
immediate government employer.31 Those laws and the commis-
sion constitute what is frequently referred to as the civil service
system of employment.
One important function of the civil service system is the
regulation of discharges in order to protect employees from arbi-
trary action by their employer and to insure that the govern-
ment does not lose competent employees without adequate
justification.3 2 But the civil service system has always recognized
that employees who are totally competent in their job performance
may nevertheless be discharged if the grounds for discharge
further a legitimate public policy. 3 Therefore, if a legitimate
public policy is served by conditioning continued government
of patronage, as the recognized reward for loyal service to a victorious political party. See
Friedrich, The Rise and Decline of the Spoils Tradition, 189 AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SC.
ANNALS 10, 13 (1937). The interest of the people in having only qualified personnel on the
public payroll, however, was recognized by statute in 1883 when Congress passed the
Pendleton Act (Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (codified in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.)), which required that appointive positions in the federal service, with certain
exceptions, be filled on the basis of an applicant's ability or merit, measured by open,
competitive examinations. 5 U.S.C. § 3304 (1970). The Act also established the Civil Service
Commission, which is charged with overseeing the implementation of the Act's provisions.
Id. § 1101.
Since the passage of the Pendleton Act, 31 states and most municipalities have enacted
similar laws, adopting what is now popularly described as the merit principle. COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES 176-79 (1952). Most of those state and local merit
laws, however, as well as the federal Pendleton Act, exempt a myriad of governmental
appointive positions from the operation of the merit principle. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 3302,
3324 (1970). The reasons for exempting certain positions from a merit requirement may be
purely political in nature, although more frequently they stem from a belief that the abilities
necessary for the adequate performance of some jobs cannot be measured by examinations
or that some jobs require no special skills for their adequate performance.
31 Civil Service Commission members are ordinarily appointed by a government's chief
executive officer. Most commissions have either four or six members, only half of whom can
be from the same political party. A. SAGESER, FIRST Two DECADES OF THE PENDLETON
AcT-A STUDY OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM (1935).
32 For discussion of the functions of civil service commissions, see W. CARPENTER, THE
UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM (1952); COMM'N OF INQUIRY ON PUBLIG
SERVICE PERSONNEL, PROBLEMS OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SERVICE (1935); A. SAGESER; supra
note 31; Kaplan, Civil Service Seventy-Five Years, 47 NAT'L MUN. REV. 220 (1958).
11 See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 50(4)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1974). That statute
provides for the discharge of civil service employees for the conviction of any crime, even
though the particular crime does not affect job performance. Other civil service acts require
municipal employees to reside within the city for which they work as a condition of
continued employment, although residency does not affect job performance. See, e.g., MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 31, § 48A (1973). It should be noted, however, that laws prohibiting civil
service employment of convicts have encountered constitutional challenges recently. See, e.g.,
Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
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employment on union membership or on the payment of a bar-
gaining fee to the union, union security devices are not contrary to
the merit principle or civil service system.
Moreover, the same reasons that justify legislation authorizing
agreements between unions and private employers for the dis-
charge of employees who fail to contribute at least some money to
the support of their bargaining agent apply equally well where a
government employer is involved. These reasons are two-fold.
First, under the predominant type of state public employee bar-
gaining legislation,34 as well as under the NLRA and RLA,35 a
union selected as bargaining agent by the majority of workers in
the appropriate unit must represent all employees in the unit
-union and nonunion alike-in a nondiscriminatory manner. Un-
less the employees in the unit who remain nonunion can be
compelled to contribute to the costs of union representation, which
may be considerable, the nonunion employees will enjoy the
benefits of the bargaining process while union members are forced
to assume the entire burden of paying for it.36 Second, since the
union members in a bargaining unit may be unable to finance
adequately the negotiation and administration of a collective bar-
gaining agreement without some monetary contribution from the
nonunionists, the resulting financial instability of the duly-elected
bargaining agent may jeopardize meaningful collective bargaining
by encouraging the union to assume an unnecessarily militant
attitude toward management in an effort to rally more employees
to its financial support. This instability also encourages the em-
ployer to be obstinate, in hopes of forcing a favorable agreement
from a weak union.
The desire to encourage financial stability in unions acting as
exclusive bargaining agents, coupled with the desire to eliminate
the patent unfairness that exists when a union is required by law to
represent nonunion employees without any remuneration, led to
the NLRA and RLA provisions authorizing bargaining over union
security devices in the private sector.37 These same policies are
" See CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 7-468(b), (c) (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-8 (Supp.
1973); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(11) (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13-A-5.3 (Supp. 1974).
35 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970); 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970). For a recognition of the duty of
fair representation under the NLRA, see Syres v. Oil Workers, Local 23, 350 U.S. 892
(1955). See also Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (recognition of that
duty under RLA).
" The classic denunciation of such "free-riders" has been made on several occasions by
Samuel Gompers. See, e.g., Gompers, Talks on Labor, 12 AM. FEDERATONIST 221, 222 (1905).
37 96 CONG. REc. 16,279 (1950) (remarks of Senator Hill); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1975]
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equally applicable in public employment, where laws require a
union selected by the majority of workers in an appropriate unit to
represent all employees in the unit regardless of their union
affiliation. At the least, these policies support legislative authoriza-
tion of bargaining over union security devices that require all
public employees in the unit to bear their fair share of bargaining
expenses, in what is termed a "fair share agreement."
In the private sector, the NLRA and RLA, however, authorize
more than fair share agreements. Under these acts the parties may
negotiate "agency shops," which require all nonunion employees in
the bargaining unit to pay a sum of money equivalent to union
dues, fees, and assessments as a condition of employment, even
though that sum may be more than the employee's fair share of
bargaining costs.3 8 The NLRA and RLA also permit union shops,
which require all employees in the unit to become union members,
and maintenance of membership agreements, which require em-
ployees who elect to become union members to retain their union
membership until expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement.3 9 As is the case with the agency shop, under the union
shop and maintenance of membership agreement an employer
cannot discharge an employee other than for his failure to pay
union dues, fees, and assessments. 40 Because enforceable member-
ship obligations of the union shop and maintenance of member-
ship agreement are limited by the NLRA and RLA to the payment
of union dues, fees, and assessments, the union shop, maintenance
of membership agreement, and agency shop have become the
practical equivalent of one another in the private sector.4 1
III
FIRST, FIFTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The opponents of public sector union security arrangements
increase in both vociferousness and number when that phrase is
1st Sess. 6-7 (1947). As Senator Hill put it, "[tlhe question ... is whether those who enjoy the
fruits and the benefits of the unions should make a fair contribution to the support of the
unions." 96 CONG. REc. 16,279 (1950).
38 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970); 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
39 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970); 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
40 Under the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970)), the enforceable obligations of union
membership do not include the payment of assessments, but instead are limited to the
payment of "periodic dues and the initiation fees." Under the RLA (45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970)),
the enforceable obligations of union membership are limited to the payment of "periodic
dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties)."
41 See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 741 (1963); Retail Clerks Local
1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 99 (1963).
[Vol. 60:183
PUBLIC SECTOR UNION SECURITY
not limited to the fair share agreement, but, instead, is expanded
to encompass the union shop, agency shop, and maintenance of
membership agreement approved for the private sector by the
NLRA and RLA. That same opposition also surfaces periodically in
the private sector in spite of the long entrenchment of those
agreements.42 One reason for the continuing opposition in the
private sector and the attempt to prevent the expansion of union
security devices into public employment is the possibility that union
shop, agency shop, and maintenance of membership agreements
may infringe an objecting employee's freedom of speech and
association as protected by the first and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution, and deprive him of his right to
work as protected by the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. Indeed, even the more limited fair share
agreement has been opposed on these grounds. 43
The constitutionality of union security devices was first ex-
amined by the United States Supreme Court in Railway Employees'
Department v. Hanson.4 4 After finding that union security agree-
ments negotiated pursuant to congressional authorization in the
RLA involved the requisite governmental action for invoking the
tenets of the Constitution,45 the Court sustained those agreements
against attacks leveled under the first and fifth amendments. It
held that a union shop agreement negotiated under the RLA,
which limits the enforceable obligations of union membership to
the payment of "dues, initiation fees and assessments, '' 46 on its face
neither deprived objecting employees of their right to work as
protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment, nor
infringed their right of free speech or freedom of association as
guaranteed by the first amendment. The Court, however, carefully
limited its holding, stating:
[I]f the exaction of union dues, initiation fees, or assessments
is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other
action in contravention of the First Amendment, this judgment
will not prejudice the decision in that case.... We only hold that
the requirement for financial support of the collective-bargaining
42 See, e.g., NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK COMM., REPORT, supra note 28.
43 Id.
44 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (nonunion employee challenge of union shop agreement on first
and fifth amendment grounds).
4' The Court found the enactment of the federal statute authorizing union shop
agreements to constitute "the governmental action on which the Constitution operates,
though it takes a private agreement to invoke the federal sanction." Id. at 232.
46 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
1975]
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agency by all who receive the benefits of its work ... does not
violate either the First or the Fifth Amendments. 47
The Court also noted that the "financial support" which it found to
be constitutionally unobjectionable in Hanson "relates . . . to the
work of the union in the realm of collective bargaining. '48 Hence,
in Hanson, the Court gave its approval to union security devices
under which the only enforceable obligation of union membership
is the payment of union dues, fees, and assessments and under
which all sums collected are utilized to defray the costs of collective
bargaining.
Under union shop, agency shop, and maintenance of member-
ship agreements, however, sums collected from employees are
often in excess of what is necessary to defray the costs of collective
bargaining, with the additional moneys being utilized to further
other union activities. Those union activities are often political in
nature, such as lobbying for legislative programs and supporting
candidates for elective offices, or they may be nonpolitical in
nature, but unrelated to the collective bargaining process, such as
contributions to employee sick funds.49 Indeed, it is only the fair
share agreement that limits employees' payments to their union to
the exact amount necessary to cover the costs of collective bargain-
ing, with each employee paying his fair share of these costs.50
The constitutional permissibility of using moneys collected
under union security agreements to support political causes which
are contrary to the views of dissenting employees was questioned in
International Association of Machinists v. Street.5' In Street, the em-
ployees alleged before a Georgia trial court that the money each was
forced to pay under a union shop agreement negotiated pursuant
to the RLA was used in substantial part to support political cam-
paigns, economic ideologies, and legislative programs opposed by
them. The trial court found that the various political expenditures
made by the union were not germane to the collective bargaining
process and that the enforcement of the union shop agreement
violated the United States Constitution to the extent the funds
exacted from employees under the agreement were used to finance
47 351 U.S. at 238.
48 Id at 235.
49 For a discussion of the types of activities that'unions might finance through union
dues and fees, see Hopfl, The Agency Shop Question, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 478, 480 (1964).
5" This limitation is inherent in the definition of a fair share agreement. See note 19
supra.
51 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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political activities opposed to the views of the dissenting employees.
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.52
On appeal, the majority of the United States Supreme Court
circumvented all federal constitutional issues by construing the
relevant section of the RLA53 "to deny the unions, over an
employee's objection, the power to use his exacted funds to sup-
port political causes which he opposes. 54 Four Justices, however,
refused to ignore the first amendment implications of the chal-
lenged expenditures. Justice Frankfurter, whom Justice Harlan
joined in a dissenting opinion, found that the first amendment
rights of objecting employees are not infringed by a union's ex-
pending funds collected under a union security agreement to
finance political activities. 55 Justice Black reached a contrary con-
clusion in his dissenting opinion, agreeing with the minority em-
ployees that such use of "extorted" funds was contrary to the dictates
of the first amendment.5 6 Justice Douglas, although concurring in
the majority opinion, adopted the same reasoning as Justice Black
on the first amendment implications of the challenged
expenditures.57
52 215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E.2d 796 (1959).
53 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970); see note 58 infra.
54 367 U.S. at 768-69.
55 According to Justice Frankfurter,
[t]he gist of the complaint here is that the expenditure of a portion of mandatory
funds for political objectives denies free speech-the right to speak or to remain
silent-to members who oppose, against the constituted authority of union desires,
this use of their union dues. No one's desire or power to speak his mind is checked
or curbed. The individual member may express his views in any public or private
forum as freely as he could before the union collected his dues.
Id. at 806 (dissenting opinion).
56 There can be no doubt that the federally sanctioned union-shop contract here,
as it actually works, takes a part of the earnings of some men and turns it over to
others, who spend a substantial part of the funds so received in efforts to thwart the
political, economic and ideological hopes of those whose money has been forced
from them under authority of law. This injects federal compulsion into the political
and ideological processes, a result which 1 have supposed everyone would agree the
First Amendment was particularly intended to prevent. And it makes no difference
if, as is urged, political and legislative activities are helpful adjuncts of collective
bargaining....
[T]he First Amendment bars use of dues extorted from an employee by law for
the promotion of causes, doctrines and laws that unions generally favor to help the
unions, as well as any other political purposes.
ML at 789-91 (dissenting opinion).
5 Id. at 775-79.
This means that membership in a group cannot be conditioned on the
individual's acceptance of the group's philosophy. Otherwise, First Amendment
rights are required to be exchanged for the group's attitude, philosophy, or politics.
I do not see how that is permissible under the Constitution. Since neither Congress
nor the state legislatures can abridge those rights, they cannot grant the power to
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It is unlikely that the first amendment issues raised by political
expenditures of forced contributions under union security agree-
ments will be resolved in the private sector. The issue under the
RLA has been mooted by Street, and the NLRA, which governs
most other private employees, contains language authorizing union
security agreements that is almost identical to that of the RLA.58
Since the Supreme Court interpreted the RLA as prohibiting
political expenditures, thereby avoiding all first amendment ques-
tions, it would be almost certain to place a similar interpretation on
that language in the NLRA.59
The first amendment problems created by political expendi-
tures from funds collected under union security agreements can-
not be avoided in the public sector, however, because of the lack of
federal legislation susceptible of an interpretation like that placed
on the RLA by the Supreme Court in Street, and because so many
of these agreements are now being negotiated covering public
employees.60 If the Court were to adopt the Black-Douglas view
that the first amendment bars the use of funds obtained under
union security agreements to support political activities, over an
employee's objection, the negative impact on the collective bargain-
ing process would be far greater where public employee unions are
involved than it would be in the case of private employee unions.61
In the private sector, the primary determinant of whether a
union will attain its demands on conditions of employment is the
willingness of management to make concessions, and not prior
political decisions made by legislators and executive officials out-
side the collective bargaining process. Instead, legislation and ex-
private groups to abridge them. As I read the First Amendment, it forbids any
abridgment by government whether directly or indirectly.
Id. at 777 (concurring opinion).
58 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). Like the RLA, the NLRA forbids discrimination against
a nonunion employee if membership was not available to that employee on the same terms
as to other employees, or membership has been denied that employee on grounds other
than nonpayment of dues. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970); 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
59 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals construed the NLRA in precisely this fashion in
Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 1970). Accord, Reid
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408, 411 (10th Cir. 1971).
60 In 1972, for example, the Michigan Education Association reported that it had
agency shop clauses in about one-half of its 530 contracts with local school boards. 512 GOV'T
EMPLOYEE REL. REP., July 16, 1973, at B-1.
61 Public employees at the federal level are already subject to certain legal restraints on
their political activities under the Hatch Act (5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1970)), which provides that
an employee of an executive agency may not: "(1) use his official authority or influence for
the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election; or (2) take an active
part in political management or in political campaigns." Id.
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ecutive decisions generally regulate only the manner in which
collective bargaining must be conducted and rarely have any direct
impact on the terms finally included in a collective agreement. In
contrast, in the public sector unions are forced to bargain with
employers who are themselves public officials and who are desig-
nated under public employment bargaining laws to represent the
government in the collective bargaining process. Generally the
public officials so designated are the heads of various government
agencies. 62 Under some state public employment bargaining laws,
agency heads actually have the authority to negotiate binding
collective bargaining agreements covering the employees in their
respective agencies. 63 Nevertheless, the terms of these collective
agreements are directly affected by prior "political" decisions, such
as the approval of an agency budget or the allocation of tax
moneys, made by the government's legislative body or by its chief
executive official outside the collective bargaining process. 64 If the
first amendment is construed to prohibit public employee unions
from expending, over an employee's objection, money collected
under union security agreements to finance lobbying and other
similar activities aimed at promoting decisions on such "political"
matters favorable to their bargaining demands, the unions' ability
to achieve their demands when collective bargaining actually occurs
would be severely limited.
Further, under some public employment bargaining laws, the
officials who represent the government in collective bargaining do
not possess the authority to conclude binding collective bargaining
agreements. Instead, the collective agreements negotiated by those
officials with the relevant unions are only tentative in nature and
must subsequently be presented to the government's legislative
body for its final approval or rejection. 65 Although lobbying a
legislative body traditionally has been deemed to be a purely
political activity, in this instance lobbying is not only germane to
the collective bargaining process, but it is also an integral part of it.
Indeed, if "political" is defined as "pertaining to... the conduct of
62 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1309 (Supp. 1970); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN.
§ 28-9.1-5 (Supp. 1973).
c3 See statutes cited note 62 supra.
64 For an analysis of the relationship between governmental budget-making and the
collective bargaining process, see Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective,
83 YALE L.J. 1156, 1172-76 (1974).
" See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4330 (Supp. 197-3); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.81(16)
(1974).
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government, '66 the entire collective bargaining process in the pub-
lic sector is political in nature, since its outcome will determine the
relationship of a government to its employees and, at least where
financial matters are negotiated, will likely determine the- funds
that will be available for all other governmental programs. Hence,
under the Black-Douglas view that the first amendment bars the
use of funds obtained under union security agreements to finance
political activities despite an employee's objection, union security
agreements would automatically be unconstitutional in the public
sector, since the primary purpose of a union security agreement is
to force objecting employees to contribute to the costs of collective
bargaining-a political activity.
Yet it is exceedingly unlikely that such a result was ever
foreseen by Black or Douglas. Implicit in Hanson, a decision written
by Douglas, was a recognition of the societal interests in furthering
collective bargaining and the need for devices to finance it
adequately.67 The courts are almost certain to continue to recog-
nize that need where public employees are involved. The possible
first amendment problems created by union security devices, there-
fore, cannot be resolved through the political expenditure-
collective bargaining expenditure dichotomy suggested by Black
and Douglas, because political overtones permeate the entire bar-
gaining process in the public sector. Instead, when the activities of
a union are absolutely essential to meaningful collective bargaining
in the public sector, a court is likely to sustain against constitutional
attack the financing of these activities through compulsory union
dues notwithstanding the political overtones, just as the Supreme
Court, in Hanson, upheld the use of compulsory dues to defray the
costs of collective bargaining in the private sector.
On the other hand, even in the public sector certain types of
activities carried on by unions are so traditionally and purely
political in nature and so tangentially related to the collective
bargaining process that the financing of these activities through
compulsory union dues should be viewed as an infringement of
first amendment rights. These activities would include campaign
contributions and the support of legislative programs that are not
an integral part of the collective bargaining process. For a govern-
ment, which is an actual party to a union security agreement in the
public sector, to extract funds from its employees to be used by
unions for such purposes runs counter to one of the basic tenets of
66 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1909 (2d ed. 1934)."
67 351 U.S. at 233-34.
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the first amendment-that an individual is free to speak or not to
speak on matters that are purely political in nature. To respond, as
Justice Frankfurter did in his dissent in Street, that a union security
agreement does not prevent one from asserting his own ideas
68
ignores the fact that by forcing one to contribute financial support
to political views contrary to his own, such an agreement compels
one to speak on political issues.
The Supreme Court has never discussed the constitutionality
of union security agreements that condition initial or continuing
employment on full union membership, which would entail not
only payment of union dues and fees, but also adherence to other
union rules governing employee conduct with respect to manage-
ment and the union organization itself. 69 Union security agree-
ments of that type, which include the closed shop, true union shop,
and maintenance of membership agreement,70 on their face raise
serious freedom of association questions under the first amend-
ment. Since those agreements are now invalid under the NLRA
and RLA,7 which govern most private sector employees, any
dispute over their constitutionality is likely to arise in the public
sector under recently enacted public employment bargaining laws.
As already noted, the first amendment problems are magnified in
the public sector because a government agency is an actual party to
the agreement.
When a person's ability to obtain or retain employment is
conditioned on his assuming the full obligations of union member-
ship, his freedom to associate or not to associate with whom he
chooses is obviously impaired. That impairment may not violate
the right to freedom of association as guaranteed by the first
68 See note 55 supra.
69 One common union rule requires all members to attend regularly scheduled union
meetings. Another requires all members to participate in strikes that are authorized by the
majority of union members. Strikes by public employees, however, are illegal at the federal
level and in all states except Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Vermont, which recognize a limited
right to strike by public employees when the strike will not endanger the public health or
safety. See HAWAII REv. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Supp.
1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730(3) (Supp. 1974). For a general discussion of union rules
and discipline, see Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049
(1951).
70 In either a true union shop or a maintenance of membership agreement, the
membership requirement upon which employment is conditioned is actual union member-
ship, with its full obligations. In the union shop and maintenance of membership agreement
authorized under the NLRA, the obligations of union membership upon which employment
may be conditioned are expressly limited to the payment of union dues and fees (29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1970)), and under the RLA to the payment of union dues, fees, and assess-
ments. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970); see note 40 supra.
71 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970); 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
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amendment, however, if there is a compelling state interest to
justify it. 72
One possible justification for closed shop, union shop, and
maintenance of membership agreements is that by requiring all
employees in the bargaining unit to abide by union rules as a
condition of employment, the union can exert extensive control
over employee conduct during the bargaining process. Such con-
trol can be used to ensure that bargaining demands authorized by
a majority of employees in the bargaining unit will be supported by
all employees in the unit, thereby contributing to a union's
negotiating strength. That strength is essential to meaningful par-
ticipation by employees in collective bargaining, a societal interest
recognized by the Supreme Court in Hanson.73 When organized
labor was in its infancy, the societal interest in encouraging the
development of strong unions to facilitate meaningful collective
bargaining may have been sufficiently compelling to justify state
action forcing objecting employees to become full participating
members in majority unions. Today, however, unions are potent
forces at the bargaining table in both the public and private
sectors.7 4 In fact, most of the unions representing public employees
are large, well-established private sector unions that have assumed
representation in the public sector.75 Hence, the state interest in
encouraging the development of strong unions can no longer be
deemed sufficiently compelling 76 to justify the impairment of the
right to freedom of association that necessarily results from closed
shop, union shop, and maintenance of membership agreements.
72 The Supreme Court, on occasion, has sustained serious invasions of first amendment
rights when the competing state interest was sufficiently compelling. For an analysis of the
Supreme Court decisions that balance the claims of individuals under the first amendment
against the claims of the community, see Brett, Free Speech, Supreme-Court Style: A View from
Overseas, 46 TExAs L. REv. 668, 672-77 (1968); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J.
1424 (1962).
73 Railway Employee's Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
74 See S. Ru. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1959). The Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare declared that
[a] strong independent labor movement is a vital part of American institutions ....
The problems of this now large and relatively strong institution are not unlike the
difficulties faced by other groups in American society which aspire to live by the
same basic principles and values within their group as they hold ideal for the whole
community.
Id.
75 See J. STIEBER, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONISM: STRUCTuRE, GRowrH, POLICY 3-6 (1973).
76 For an examination of the types of state interests that have been deemed sufficiently
compelling to justify serious impairments in first amendment rights, see Emerson, supra note
72, at 928-49; Frantz, supra note 72, at 1426-27, 1429.
[Vol. 60:183
PUBLIC SECTOR UNION SECURITY
Private sector experience with the closed shop, union shop,
and maintenance of membership agreement also suggests that
these agreements should not be authorized in the public sector
even if they do not violate the first amendment. Union abuses of
such agreements under the NLRA were so invidious that a 1947
amendment outlawed the dosed shop and limited the enforceable
obligations of union membership under the union shop and
maintenance of membership agreement to the payment of union
dues and fees.77 It is likely that the same abuses would occur in the
public sector if these agreements were permitted.
IV
THE IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS CLAUSE
Union security agreements of the type permitted in the private
sector raise an additional issue of federal constitutional significance
when applied to tenured public school teachers. Thirty-seven states
now have teacher tenure laws which prohibit state agencies and
local school boards from discharging teachers who have fulfilled
the requirements for tenure set forth in these laws, except for
causes specifically enumerated.78 Some of these state tenure laws
could be, and have been, construed to give teachers meeting the
requirements for tenure a contractual right to continued employ-
ment that can be terminated only for the causes expressly stated in
the law at the time the tenure contract was created. 79 A state
legislature may be unable to amend that type of tenure law to
authorize discharge for failure to abide by a union security agree-
ment because tenured teachers whose contracts were in existence
prior to the passage of any such amendment may be protected
from discharge by the impairment of contracts clause of the United
States Constitution."0
Certainly the enforcement of a union security agreement
would impair the contract rights of teachers whose tenure contracts
arose prior to legislative authorization of union security. The issue,
7 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 140
(1947), amending 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1946) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970)). The
Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970)) imposes a similar limitation on union security
devices.
78 M. MOSKOW, TACHERS AND UNIONS 77 (1966).
79 See, e.g., Indiana ex reL Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938); text beginning at
note 86 infra.
So U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 10. That provision forbids any state to "pass any . .. Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
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however, of whether that impairment is significant enough to
contravene the contract clause requires an examination of the cases
construing this clause.
One of the most significant cases involving the contract clause
since the turn of the century is Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell.8' At issue in Blaisdell was the Minnesota Mortgage
Moratorium Law82 enacted during the -Depression. The law au-
thorized state courts to postpone real property foreclosure sales
and to extend the period of redemption from foreclosure "for such
additional time as the court may deem just and equitable," but in
no event beyond May 31, 1935.83 In upholding the Moratorium
Law against an attack under the contract clause, the Court relied
on three factors: (1) the law was an appropriate exercise of the
state's police power; (2) it only temporarily impaired contract
rights; and (3) it was a reasonable attempt by the legislature to
alleviate an extreme economic emergency. The Court stated: "An
emergency existed in Minnesota which furnished a proper occasion
for the exercise of the reserved [police] power of the State to
protect the vital interests of the community. '84
If, applying the Blaisdell analysis, a contractual impairment is
valid only when it results from a reasonable attempt by state
officials to alleviate an emergency and only if the impairment is
temporary, then the impairment of tenure contracts through the
enforcement of union security agreements would violate the con-
tract clause. Clearly, any impairment of a tenure contract that
results from the enforcement of a union security agreement would
be permanent. 85 Moreover, it is difficult to envision any type of
state emergency that would reasonably require legislative authori-
zation of union security agreements.
In Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand,86 however, the Supreme
Court suggested in dictum that a less stringent standard is applica-
ble in assessing the constitutionality of contractual impairments
under the contract clause. That decision, rendered four years after
Blaisdell, involved the impairment of a teacher tenure contract
under the Indiana Tenure Act.8 7 Adopted in 1927, that Act
81 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
82 Ch. 339, [1933) Minn. Laws 514.
'3 Id. part 1, § 4.
84 290 U.S. at 444.
85 Since the enforcement of the union security agreements would result in discharge of
the employee, the impairment of rights would certainly be permanent.
86 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
87 Ch. 97, §§ 1-6 [1927) Ind. Acts. 259.
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provided that teachers who served under contract for five or more
successive years and thereafter entered into a contract for further
services with the same school system would become permanent
teachers. The Act further provided that if a contract of a perma-
nent teacher expired, it would nevertheless be deemed to continue
in effect until a new contract was negotiated or until cancelled for
any of the reasons specified in the Tenure Act. The Tenure Act
permitted cancellation of a permanent contract for "incompetency,
insubordination . . . neglect of duty, immorality, justifiable de-
crease in the number of teaching positions or other good and just
cause . . ... 88 Subsequently, the Indiana Legislature deleted the
section of the Tenure Act that protected teachers in township
school districts. The plaintiff in Brand, a teacher in a township
school, had attained permanent status before the Tenure Act was
amended, but was threatened with discharge after the amendment
on grounds not mentioned in the 1927 Act. 9
The Supreme Court, in examining the Tenure Act, found that
the word "contract" appeared twenty-five times and that the tenor
of the Act as a whole indicated this word was used in its normal
legal sense. The Court concluded that, although state legislatures
are normally free to repeal or amend their own statutes at any
time, the Indiana Tenure Act contained provisions which, when
acted upon by teachers, became a permanent contract between the
teachers and the state within the protection of the impairment of
contracts clause of the Constitution. Thus, plaintiff could be dis-
charged only on the grounds stated in the Act at the time she met
its requirements for tenure.90
The Court noted by way of dicta, however, that every contract
is made subject to the implied condition that its fulfillment "may be
frustrated by a proper exercise of the police power" and that "in
order to have this effect, the exercise of the power must be for an
end which is in fact public and the means. adopted must be
reasonably adapted to that end." 91 Although the Court found
that state action designed to aid in the efficient administration of
public schools is a proper exercise of the police power, it neverthe-
less ruled that the amendment of the Tenure Act, which had the
effect of authorizing discharges on grounds other than those
specified in the original Act, was not a valid exercise of the police
88 Id. § 2.
9 303 U.S. at 97; id at 110 (Black, J., dissenting).
90 303 U.S. at 106.
91 Id. at 109.
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power. The Court reached that conclusion on the basis of the
provision in the earlier Act permitting discharge for "good and just
cause." 92 The Court reasoned that every valid public purpose
which conceivably could be furthered by discharging tenured
teachers was covered by this language. Hence, any amendment of
the Act that permitted discharge on other grounds could not be an
"exercise of the police power for the attainment of ends to which
its exercise may properly be directed.
93
Under the reasoning implicit in Brand, union security devices
would be permissible even though their enforcement permanently
impaired tenure contracts and even though no emergency existed,
provided they were deemed a proper exercise of the state police
power. Moreover, legislative authorization of union security in
public employment is likely to be viewed as an appropriate exercise
of the state police power. Although earlier decisions construed the
police power to be limited to the protection of the public health,
safety, and morals,94 today the police power concept has been
expanded to encompass also the general welfare.95 The phrase
"general welfare" includes every state action with almost any con-
ceivable public purpose 96 and, as the Court stated in Brand, in-
cludes action designed to facilitate the efficient administration of
public schools.
Union security agreements should be deemed appropriate
state action to further the efficient administration of public schools
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Railway Employees'
Department v. Hanson.97 In Hanson, the Court held that congres-
sional authorization of union shops for railroad employees was
appropriate action under the commerce clause to promote indus-
trial peace along the arteries of interstate commerce. 98 Similar
reasoning supports the conclusion that state authorization of union
92 Ch. 97, § 2, (1927] lnd. Acts 259; see 303 U.S. at 103.
93 303 U.S. at 109.
94 See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27,
31 (1885); Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1878); Hannibal & St. Joseph
R.R. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1878).
9' See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Day-Brite Lighting, inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952). In Berman, the Court noted that "[p]ublic safety, public
health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order . . . are some of the more conspicuous
examples of the traditional application of the police power .... Yet they merely illustrate the
scope of the power and do not delimit it." 348 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added).
96 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 296, 305, 311, 315 (1959); B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 42-44 (1965).
97 351 U.S. 225 (1956); see notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
98 351 U.S. at 233; see note 45 supra.
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security agreements for teachers would promote peace in public
schools, thereby qualifying as an appropriate exercise of the state
police power facilitating the efficient administration of public
schools.
Thus the Blaisdell restriction on the impairment of contracts,
as modified by Brand, would permit the enforcement of union
security agreements against teachers whose tenure contracts arose
prior to legislative authorization of union security. A more recent
Supreme Court decision, however, indicates that although the state
can exercise its police power to permanently impair contract rights
in the absence of an emergency, there are restrictions on such an
exercise of the police power which were not stated in Brand.
In City of El Paso v. Simmons,9 the Court, relying on Blaisdell,
permitted Texas to modify permanently its own obligations under
a contract to sell public land. At an early date, Texas had enacted a
law authorizing the sale of public land on long term contracts for a
small down payment of the principal and an annual payment of
principal and interest. 100 Under that law, the purchaser or his
vendees could reinstate the purchaser's rights to the land after a
forfeiture for nonpayment of interest, by paying the delinquent
interest at any future time if no rights of third parties had inter-
vened. Subsequently, Texas amended the law to restrict the right
of reinstatement to the last purchaser from the state or his
vendees' 01 and to require that this right be exercised within five
years from the date of forfeiture. 0 2
In upholding the amended statute against a challenge leveled
under the contract clause, the Court emphasized the state's interest
in restoring confidence in the stability of land titles that the earlier
law had undermined. It also found that "the promise of reinstate-
ment . . .was not the central undertaking of the seller nor the
primary consideration for the buyer's undertaking."' 0 3 The Court
did not suggest, however, that the public lack of confidence in land
titles had risen to the level of an emergency, as it had with respect
to mortgages in Blaisdell. Instead, the Court merely noted that the
state had a vital interest in the efficient administration of public
lands and in the stability of land titles that the amended statute was
attempting to effectuate. Thus, under El Paso, a state can perma-
9 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
100 Ch. 47, § 11, [1895] Tex. Gen. Laws; ch. 129, art. 4218f, [1897] Tex. Gen. Laws.
101 Ch. 59, § 2, [1951] Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws.
102 Ch. 191, § 3, [1941] Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws.
103 379 U.S. at 514.
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nently impair contract rights through any valid exercise of police
power, even though this exercise is not directed at alleviating an
emergency, subject to the qualification not stated in Brand that the
impairment does not involve a central undertaking of the contract.
One of the state's central undertakings in a tenure contract, or
in any employment contract, is its commitment not to terminate
employment except on the grounds stated in the contract. Hence,
the enforcement of a union security agreement against teachers
whose preexisting contracts did not provide for discharge on that
ground would seem to contravene a central undertaking of their
employment contracts. It follows, therefore, that even under the
reasoning of El Paso, union security agreements may violate the
contract clause when they are enforced against teachers whose
tenure contracts came into existence prior to legislative authoriza-
tion of union security.
In Ohison v. Phillips,10 4 however, a three judge district court
construed the El Paso decision to permit the discharge of tenured
teachers and other teachers under contract with the state of Col-
orado on grounds not mentioned in their employment contracts.
Colorado had enacted a law prescribing loyalty oaths for all
teachers in public schools, 10 5 including those teachers already
under contract with the state. Teachers who refused to subscribe to
the oath were to be discharged.
In upholding the law against a challenge that it impaired
preexisting contract rights, the court, citing El Paso, reasoned that
a contractual impairment is not unconstitutional if insubstantial
when balanced against a legitimate state interest. Without further
analysis, the court concluded that any impairment of the teachers'
employment contracts resulting from the loyalty oath law was
insubstantial when balanced against the legitimate state interest in
the loyalty of teachers.1 0 6
It is difficult to perceive on what basis the court could con-
clude that discharging teachers on grounds not stated in their
employment contracts is an "insubstantial" impairment of their
contract rights. Discharging employees on grounds other than
those set forth in their employment contracts would appear to be a
serious infringement. Such an infringement is clearly distinguish-
able from one that merely limits the time in which contractual
rights must be asserted and the number of persons who may assert
those rights, as was the case in El Paso.
104 304 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1969), aff'd mem., 397 U.S. 317 (1970).
105 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 123-17-6, -17-7, -17-8 (1964).
106 304 F. Supp. at 1156.
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Further, in El Paso, the Supreme Court, in ruling on the
constitutionality of the contractual impairment before it, did not
purport to balance the substantiality of the contractual impairment
against the state interest involved,' 0 7 as the three judge district
court did in Ohison. If the El Paso decision is read in conjunction
with Blaisdell and Brand, however, a balancing test may be appro-
priate. It is possible to construe the three cases to mean that the
state may impair minor contractual undertakings through any
proper exercise of its police power, but that impairments in the
central undertakings of contracts are valid only when they result
from an exercise of the state police power reasonably directed at
alleviating an emergency.' 0 8 Under this analysis, the constitutional-
ity of a contractual impairment depends on the severity of the
impairment and the urgency of the state interest being served.
Consequently, the test for determining the constitutionality of a
contractual impairment under the contract clause would be similar
to the test for determining the constitutionality of an impairment
of a fundamental right under the due process and equal protection
clauses. An impairment of a fundamental right is constitutionally
permissible only when it can be justified by a compelling state
interest. 09
Yet even under a balancing test, union security agreements
107 Justice Black, however, in a dissenting opinion, chastised the majority for employing
what he characterized as a balancing test in reaching its decision:
I have previously had a number of occasions to dissent from judgments of this
Court balancing away the First Amendment's unequivocally guaranteed rights of
free speech, press, assembly and petition. In this case I am compelled to dissent
from the Court's balancing away the plain guarantee of Art. I, § 10, that "No state
shall... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ..... a balancing
which results in the state of Texas' taking a man's private property for public use
without compensation ....
379 U.S. at 517. He concluded his dissent by reiterating his view that the majority's approach
was "just another example of the delusiveness of calling 'balancing' a 'test.' " Id. at 532.
Another federal district court also found that under El Paso the proper standard for
determining the constitutionality of a contractual impairment "when distilled to its essence is
. . . a balancing test." Cuyahoga Housing Auth. v. Cleveland, 342 F. Supp. 250, 254 (E.D.
Ohio 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1973).
108 The Supreme Court, however, did not expressly mention a balancing test in
reaching its decisions in Blaisdell, Brand, and El Paso. Moreover, only in El Paso did the Court
distinguish between minor contractual impairments and impairments in central undertak-
ings of the contract. Yet a balancing of interests test is one possible way to reconcile the
seeming conflict among those decisions, as Justice Black suggested in his dissent in El Paso.
See note 107 supra.
109 See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). For a detailed discussion of what
constitutes a fundamental right and an examination of decisions sustaining impairments of
fundamental rights under a compelling state interest standard, see Karst, Invidious Discrimi-
nation: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 716 (1969); 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1120-31, 1169-90 (1969).
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would violate the contract clause when enforced against teachers
whose tenure contracts arose prior to legislative authorization of
union security. The enforcement of such agreements impairs a
central undertaking of the tenure contract, which under a balanc-
ing test would require either a state emergency or, at the least, a
compelling state interest, to justify the impairment. But, as already
noted, it is impossible to envision any type of state emergency that
would reasonably require legislative authorization of union
security. 110 And, assuming that a compelling state interest would
justify the impairment, it is nevertheless unlikely that the state's
interest in eliminating free riders through the authorization of
union security rises to the level of a compelling state interest.11'
Additionally, it does not appear that the court in OhIson
actually did balance the state interest in the loyalty of teachers
against the severity of the contractual impairment in reaching its
decision. Instead, the basis for the OhIson court's holding seems to
have been that the state can impair even the central undertakings
of contracts through any valid exercise of police power, as the
Supreme Court had suggested earlier in Brand."' Indeed, at one
point in its decision, the court stated that "[a]s long as this reserved
power is exercised for a public end . . . the power may not be
restricted by individual contractual obligations."" 13
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, however, rejected this view
in Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co.' " In Fornaris, the Puerto Rico legisla-
ture had enacted a Dealer's Contract Law which provided that a
dealer's contract with a manufacturer was renewable indefinitely at
the option of the dealer, regardless of provisions for termination of
the dealership in the contract. 1 5 Subsequently, defendant man-
ufacturer terminated its contract with plaintiff dealer in accor-
dance with the terms of the contract, which antedated the Dealer's
Contract Law. Defendant manufacturer asserted that the Dealer's
Contract Law was unconstitutional under the contract clause be-
cause enforcement of the law would impair its preexisting contract
rights with the dealer. The court of appeals indicated that the
110 See notes 84-103 and accompanying text supra.
A compelling state interest is more than merely desirable social policy. For an
analysis of decisions that discuss the components of a "compelling" state interest, see Karst,
supra note 109, at 718-20; 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1087-1131 (1969); note 109 and
accompanying text supra.
12 See notes 86-96 and accompanying text supra.
113 304 F. Supp. at 1156.
114 423 F.2d 563 (1st Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 400 U.S. 41 (1970).
11 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 10, § 278a (Supp. 1968).
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impairment of contracts clause might not have any bearing on the
case because Puerto Rico is not a state.' 6 The court, however, did
find that the due process clause of the fifth amendment was
applicable. It further held that when the issue under the due
process clause is the constitutionality of a contractual impairment,
the standard to be utilized in evaluating the permissibility of the
impairment is the same standard applicable under the contract
clause. Relying on the El Paso decision, the court concluded that
the Dealer's Contract Law resulted in an unconstitutional impair-
ment of the manufacturer's contract rights because the law severely
altered the basic undertaking of the parties to the contract. In
reaching that conclusion, the court did not balance the state in-
terest being advanced by the Dealer's Contract Law against the
severity of the contractual impairment, nor did it construe El Paso
as inviting such a balancing. 17
Given the few decisions involving the contract clause in recent
years and the conflicting standards for its application that are
possible under relevant decisions, it is difficult to predict whether
union security agreements will be held to violate the contract clause
when their enforcement infringes preexisting contract rights. If
the appropriate standard for determining the constitutionality of a
contractual impairment is one that requires a balancing of the
seriousness of the impairment against the urgency of the state
interest, or that recognizes the validity of only minor contractual
impairments, then union security agreements would violate the
contract clause when enforced against teachers whose tenure con-
tracts arose prior to legislative authorization of union security
agreements. On the other hand, if the appropriate standard is one
that recognizes the validity of any contractual impairment resulting
from an appropriate exercise of the state police power, then union
security agreements would not contravene the contract clause even
when their enforcement infringed preexisting contract rights.
In many states, however, even a very restrictive interpretation
of the contract clause would not prevent the discharge of tenured
teachers for failing to abide by the terms of a union security
agreement. That is because only a few state tenure laws actually
confer contractual rights to continued) employment on teachers
fulfilling the requirements set forth in the tenure laws.' 18 Instead,
116 See note 80 supra.
117 The court merely cited El Paso, Blaisdell, andother cases as authority for its decision;
it did not mention the "balancing test" at all. 423 F.2d at 567.
11 See, e.g., Indiana ex reL Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
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the majority of tenure laws have been construed as merely limiting
the powers of local school boards to discharge tenured teachers,
rather than as conferring contractual rights." 9 As such, these laws
may be amended or repealed at any time without generating
problems under the contract clause.
Moreover, many tenure laws that could be construed as grant-
ing contractual rights to continued employment provide for the
discharge of tenured teachers for "good or just cause." 120 It is
arguable that the failure to abide by a union security agreement,
after such an agreement has been authorized by the state legisla-
ture, would constitute "good or just cause for discharge."' 2' Thus,
even if a tenure law is viewed as granting contractual rights to
continued employment, discharge for failure to abide by a union
security agreement would not violate the contract clause.
V
STATE LAW
Thirteen states now have provisions in their public employ-
ment bargaining laws that expressly permit various forms of union
security. 22 Only the provisions in the laws of Alaska, Kentucky, and
Washington, however, could be construed to authorize bargaining
over all the forms of union security presently bargainable under
the NLRA and RLA-the union shop, agency shop, maintenance
of membership agreement, and fair share agreement.1 23 The laws
19 For example, in Taylor v. Board of Educ., 31 Cal. App. 2d 734, 89 P.2d 148 (1939),
a California appellate court held that the state's Teacher Tenure Act does not confer
contractual rights to continued employment on teachers who have met the requirements for
tenure enumerated in the Tenure Act. Accord, Groves v. Board of Educ., 367 111. 91, 10
N.E.2d 403 (1937); Campbell v. Aldrich, 159 Ore. 264, 79 P.2d 1257 (1938).
120 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 31, § 43(g) (Supp. 1974); MICH. STAr. ANN. § 15.2001 (1968).
121 See text beginning at note 191 infra.
122 See notes 123-24 infra.
123 Alaska law authorizes all public employees except teachers to bargain over all forms
of union security except the closed shop. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.40.1 10(b)(1), (2), 23.40.250(5)
(1972). Kentucky law authorizes bargaining over a union shop for firefighters. Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 345.050(1)(c) (Supp. 1973). Washington law authorizes bargaining over every
form of union security except the dosed shop for all public employees. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 41.56.122(1) (Supp. 1973).
When a law such as that of Kentucky authorizes a union shop, which is a more stringent
form of union security than either the agency shop, maintenance of membership agreement,
or fair share agreement, it is likely that these other less stringent forms of union security also
will be deemed bargainable. That has been the interpretation given to § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA
(29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970)), which expressly authorizes only those union security agree-
ments requiring union "membership . . . on or after the thirtieth day following the
beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the
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of the other ten states are more restrictive in the forms of union
security that are authorized and, additionally, often distinguish
between classes of public employees in their authorization of such
devices.12 4
When public employment bargaining legislation is silent on the
negotiability of union security, the issue arises as to what, if any,
forms of union security are negotiable. In some states that issue is
resolved by general "right-to-work" legislation which applies to
both public employees and all private employees not covered by
the RLA.' 2 5 Some right-to-work laws prohibit all forms of union
security, 2 6 while others expressly prohibit only those union se-
later." NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963); American Seating Co., 98
N.L.R.B. 800 (1952).
£24 The public employment laws in Michigan (MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(10) (Supp.
1974)) and Montana (MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59-1605(c) (Supp. 1974)) authorize bargain-
ing over an agency shop for all public employees, while a Rhode Island statute (R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. §§ 36-11-1, -2 (Supp. 1973)) endorses the agency shop only for state employees.
Four other Rhode Island statutes, which grant the right to bargain collectively to firemen (id.
§ 28-9.1-6), policemen (id. § 28-9.2-6), teachers (id. § 28-9.3-4 (1969)), and municipal
employees (id § 28-9.4-3), are silent on the issue of union security. A Vermont law also
authorizes bargaining over an agency shop for municipal employees, but specifically pro-
hibits municipal employers from discriminating against an employee for failing to abide by
an agency shop agreement, thereby rendering the right to an agency shop illusory. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 99 1722(1), 1726(a)(8) (Supp. 1974). When state employees are involved,
Vermont law authorizes bargaining over a provision requiring employees to pay a fee equal
to one year of union dues if the employee wishes to utilize a union representative in any
grievance procedure. Id. tit. 3, § 941(k) (1972). Pennsylvania authorizes bargaining over
maintenance of membership dues for all public employees except policemen and firemen.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.401 (Supp. 1974). Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70(1)(h),
(2), 111.81(6), 111.84(1)(f) (1974)) and Massachusetts (MAss. LAws ANN. ch. 150E, § 12
(Supp. 1974)) authorize bargaining over a fair share agreement for all public employees,
while a Hawaii law requires all public employers to establish a fair share arrangement upon
demand by an exclusive bargaining agent. HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 89-2(16), -4 (Supp. 1973).
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65(2) (Supp. 1974)) and Oregon (ORE. REv. STAT.
99 243.711(10), (16), 243.730(4), 51 GOV'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP., Feb. 18, 1974, at Ref. File
No. 4611) authorize bargaining over a contractual provision that would require union
members to pay union dues and nonunion members to pay a pro rata share of the costs
incurred by the union in the collective bargaining process.
Instead of expressly legitimizing a particular form of union security, the public em-
ployment law applicable to school teachers in Delaware prohibits bargaining over a union
shop. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4003(a) (Cum. Supp. 1970). The other Delaware public
employment bargaining law that applies to all public employees except teachers is silent on
the issue of union security. Id. tit. 19, § 1301.
125 The local option clause of the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)
(29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970)) expressly authorizes states to enact laws prohibiting agreements
that require union membership as a condition of employment, in Retail Clerks Local 1625 v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963), the Supreme Court construed that section of the
Taft-Hartley Act as also validating state laws outlawing agreements conditioning employ-
ment on the payment of a bargaining service fee to unions. I& at 98-103.
126 The laws of Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Virginia contain
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curity devices that require actual union membership as a condition
of employment.1 2 7
In the absence of statutes dealing directly with the negotiability
of union security agreements in the public sector, the judiciary
must determine what, if any, forms of union security are negoti-
able. Because most public employment bargaining laws define the
scope of negotiable subjects in the NLRA language of "wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment,"1 2 8 the
initial issue for judicial resolution is whether a particular form of
union security comes within the plain meaning of this language.
The phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment" is, on its face, expansive enough to encompass all
existing forms of union security and was so construed under the
NLRA prior to its 1947 amendments. 129 Few decisions discuss the
negotiability of union security under the recently enacted state
public employment bargaining laws that adopt NLRA-type lan-
guage to define the scope of negotiable subjects. The New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court130 and the Oregon Attorney General'31 have
held that union shop agreements are within the plain meaning of
that language. Two Michigan trial courts also found agency shop
agreements to be within the plain meaning of that language.1 32
The interpretative issue under many public employment bar-
gaining laws, however, is more complex than merely determining
whether a particular form of union security comes within the plain
meaning of the phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment." Most public employment bargaining laws
combine an NLRA-type definition of negotiable subjects with other
statutory provisions that guarantee employees the right to join or
not to join a union, 33 or that prohibit employers from discriminat-
this type of flat prohibition. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 375(1), (5) (1958); ARK. CONST. amend. 34,
§ 1; IOWA CODE ANN. § 736A.1, .4 (1973); MIss. CONST. art. 7, § 198-A.; NEB. CONST. art. 15,
99 13, 14, 15; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-58, -62 (1970).
127 This kind of provision is found in the laws of Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Nevada,
North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, and South Dakota. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-1302 (1971); FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 6; KAN. CoNsT. art. 15, § 12; NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 613.250 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-78 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-14 (1972); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 40-46 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 60-8-3 (1967).
128 For an exhaustive list of the public employment bargaining laws that define the
scope of bargainable subjects in NLRA-type language, see Blair, supra note 2, at 7.
129 See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
10 Tremblay v. Berlin Police Union, 108 N.H. 416, 237 A.2d 668 (1968).
131 Op. Ar'Y GEN. No. 6449 (Ore. 1968).
132 Warczak v. Board of Educ., 73 L.R.R.M. 2237 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1970); Nagy v. Detroit,
60 CCH Lab. Cas. 52,105 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969).
,3 See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 202
(McKinney 1973).
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ing against employees to encourage or discourage union
membership. 34 Provisions of this type could be construed to out-
law bargaining over all, or some, forms of union security.
Certainly, closed shop and union shop agreements should be
found to violate the plain meaning of statutes that grant employees
the right not to join unions and statutes that prohibit employer
discrimination to encourage union membership. The predominant
effect of conditioning employment on union membership, as the
closed shop and union shop do, is to coerce employees into joining
unions. To permit such coercion under public employment bar-
gaining laws that grant employees the right not to join unions
would render this right meaningless. Similarly, these agreements,
by conditioning employment on union membership, require em-
ployers to distinguish between union and nonunion employees in a
manner that would tend to induce employees to join a union.
Hence, since closed shop and union shop agreements clearly con-
travene both types of statutes, they should be deemed outside the
scope of bargaining under these statutes.
Maintenance of membership agreements also appear to con-
travene the plain meaning of statutes that give employees the right
not to join unions. That right, to be meaningful, should encompass
the right to discontinue union membership. But maintenance of
membership agreements prevent employees who elect union mem-
bership from disaffiliating themselves from the union without loss
of employment until the collective bargaining agreement has ex-
pired, thereby coercing a continuation of union membership. Such
coercion should be found to violate statutes that give employees the
right not to join unions. Additionally, such coercion of continuing
membership involves employer conduct that distinguishes between
union and nonunion employees and thereby contravenes statutes
that prohibit employer discrimination to encourage union mem-
bership.
Additional support for finding union shop and maintenance
of membership agreements invalid under public employment laws
that prohibit employer discriminatory conduct to encourage union
membership comes from section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 13 5 That
section prohibits discriminatory conduct on the part of employers
to encourage or discourage union membership, but further pro-
vides that
134 See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 23.40.110(3) (1972); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(10) (Supp.
1974).
135 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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Nothing in this [Act] . . . shall preclude an employer from
making an agreement with a labor organization... to require as
a condition of employment membership therein on or after the
thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the
effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later.13 6
It is likely that most state legislatures were familiar with section
8(a)(3) and its proviso when they enacted their public employment
bargaining laws. The failure of state legislatures to adopt the
proviso which expressly validates union shop and maintenance of
membership agreements, while adopting the remainder of section
8(a)(3), could be construed to imply a legislative intent to exclude
these agreements from public sector collective bargaining.
Moreover, the absence of a section 8(a)(3)-type proviso may
further be used to infer a legislative intent to exclude even agency
shops from public sector collective bargaining. The obligations of
union membership agreements permitted by the section 8(a)(3)
proviso are limited by other language in this section to the payment
of "periodic dues and initiation fees."'1 37 The Supreme Court, in
NLRB v. General Motors Corp.,' 38 found that by so limiting the
enforceable obligations of union membership, the NLRA makes
the union shop permitted under the proviso the practical equiva-
lent of the agency shop.' 39 It is likely that most state legislatures
were familiar with the Court's description of the union shops
permitted under section 8(a)(3) when they enacted their public
employment bargaining laws. Thus, the omission of a section
8(a)(3)-type proviso from public employment laws that prohibit
employer discriminatory conduct to encourage union membership
could likewise be used to infer a legislative intent to make agency
shop agreements nonnegotiable.
The Michigan Supreme Court, in Smigel v. Southgate Community
School District,'40 found agency shop agreements to be nonnegoti-
able under a section of that state's Public Employment Relations
Act which prohibits employers from discriminating to encourage
or discourage union membership, but which contains no "savings"
proviso for union security agreements.14' Four justices relied on
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
139 Id. at 743.
140 388 Mich. 531, 202 N.W.2d 305 (1972).
141 The Michigan Public Employment Relations Act subsequently was amended to
authorize bargaining over agency shop agreements. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(10) (1968),
as amended MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(10) (Supp. 1974).
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Michigan's previously enacted Private Employment Relations
Act,142 which has provisions similar to section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA
and its proviso, as well as on the NLRA itself, in finding agency
shop agreements to be impermissible in the public sector.143 The
four justices reasoned that the absence of any similar proviso from
Michigan's Public Employment Relations Act implied a legislative
intent to invalidate agency shop agreements in the public sector.
Three justices also opined, with little analysis, that agency shop
agreements violate the plain meaning of the statutory provision
prohibiting employers from discriminating to encourage union
membership. 14
4
The Rhode Island Supreme Court 145 and appellate courts in
New York146 and New Jersey 47 also have found agency shop
agreements to be outside the scope of collective bargaining under
public employment laws that give employees the right to join or not
to join a union. Additionally, the New Jersey law1 48 gives em-
ployees the right to refrain from assisting a union, while the New
York law gives employees the right to refrain from participating in
a union. 49 The New Jersey and New York courts found that an
agency shop agreement coerces employees to join a union and, at
the very least, constitutes forced employee participation in, or
assistance to, a union, contrary to the respective state statutes. 50
142 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.454(15), (17) (1968).
141 Justices Adams, T.G. Kavanagh, T.M. Kavanagh, and Brennan relied on the
existence of a "savings" proviso in both the NLRA and the Michigan Private Employment
Relations Act in finding agency shop agreements to be invalid under the Michigan Public
Employment Relations Act. 388 Mich. at 539-43, 544-46, 202 N.W.2d at 306-08, 309-10.
Justice Williams relied solely on the existence of a "savings" proviso in the NLRA in his
opinion, which also found agency shop agreements to be invalid under the Michigan Public
Employment Relations Act. Id. at 543-44, 202 N.W.2d at 308-09.
144 Id. at 541-43, 202 N.W.2d at 308. ChiefJustice T. M. Kavanagh wrote an opinion in
which Justices Adams and T. G. Kavanagh joined.
145 Town of North Kingstown v. North Kingstown Teachers Ass'n, 110 R.I. 698, 297
A.2d 342 (1972). The Rhode Island court expressed willingness to approve agency shop
agreements strictly limited to payment by nonunion employees of only enough money to
cover the benefits actually received.
"I Farrigan v. Helsby, 42 App. Div. 2d 265, 346 N.Y.S.2d 39 (3d Dep't 1973).
147 New Jersey Turnpike Employees' Local 194 v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 123
N.J. Super. 461, 303 A.2d 599 (1973), affd, 64 N.J. 579, 319 A.2d 224 (1974).
148 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1974).
149 N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAw § 202 (McKinney 1973).
150 In Farrigan v. Helsby, 42 App. Div. 2d 265, 346 N.Y.S.2d 39 (3d Dep't 1973), the
court concluded that "any forced payment of dues or their equivalent would be in violation
of the law as constituting, at the very least, participation in an employee organization." Id. at
267, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
Similarly, in New Jersey Turnpike Employees' Local 194 v. New Jersey Turnpike
Auth., 123 N.J. Super. 461, 303 A.2d 599 (1973), affTd, 64 N.J. 579, 319 A.2d 224 (1974),
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court did not decide whether an
agency shop agreement constituted coercion that would violate an
employee's statutory right not to join a union, although this argu-
ment was discussed.' 5 ' Instead, the court found an agency shop
agreement to be nonnegotiable because it is patently unfair to
require nonunion employees to pay to a union a sum of money
-union dues and fees-that bears no relation to their actual share
of collective bargaining costs.'
52
In fact, agency shop agreements should be held to violate
statutes that grant employees the right not to join unions or that
prohibit discriminatory conduct by employers to encourage union
membership. Such agreements are inherently coercive of union
membership since they require nonunion employees to pay the
equivalent of union dues and fees to retain employment, while
denying to these employees the benefits of union membership
other than the benefits flowing directly from the collective bargain-
ing agreement. The natural desire of employees to obtain all the
benefits of union membership that they have been forced to
purchase by their employer constitutes a substantial inducement to
become a union member. That inducement is sufficient to violate
statutes guaranteeing employees the free exercise of the right not
to join a union or prohibiting employer discriminatory conduct 153
to encourage union membership.
the court assessed the validity of the agreement under the relevant New Jersey Statute'(N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1974)), which
confirms a right in public employees not only to refrain from activity in the nature
of forming or joining an employee organization but also to refrain from assisting
such an organization. The agency shop arrangement ... does purport to relate the
payments to be made by nonmembers to the union's expenses for collective
negotiations and the handling of grievances. But it also mandates that payments to
the union by nonmember employees are a condition of employment; . . . and
failure to pay results in discharge. These clauses.. . would have the predominant
effect of inducing, if not compelling, union membership, participation and assis-
tance on the part of nonmember employees.
Id. at 469-70, 303 A.2d at 604.
151 Town of North Kingstown v. North Kingstown Teachers Ass'n, 110 R.I. 698,
702-04, 297 A.2d 342, 344-45 (1972).
152 The court recognized tlat either of two types of unfairness might result, depending
upon the specific provisions of the agreement. It found that "it would he manifestly
inequitable to permit those who see fit not to join the union to benefit from its services
without at the same time requiring them to hear a fair and just share of the financial
burdens .... " On the other hand, compelling the nonunion members to pay more than a
just portion of the costs of the benefits conferred upon them by the union, "would, in effect,
sanction an inverse 'free-rider' situation in which the union member, rather than the
non-joiner, would be a 'free-rider.'" Id. at 706, 297 A.2d at 346.
153 With respect to an agency shop agreement, or any agreement conditioning employ-
ment on the payment of a fee to the union, the employer discrimination is not between
union and nonunion members, but between employees who will financially support the
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Those public employment laws, however, that attempt to pro-
tect employees in their decisions on union rfiembership also require
unions selected as exclusive bargaining agents to represent in a
nondiscriminatory manner all employees, union and nonunion
alike, in the bargaining unit.154 To impose the duty on a union to
represent nonunion employees, without permitting any device for
a union to recoup from these employees a share of the costs of
representation, is unfair and contrary to the apparent intent of
legislatures in enacting public employment bargaining laws.
The New Jersey and Rhode Island courts, as well as three
justices of the Michigan Supreme Court, have recognized this
unfairness in their decisions invalidating agency shop agreements
for public employees. 155 They have suggested in dicta that some
other union security arrangement, which relates the sum that
nonunion employees must pay a union as a condition of employ-
ment to their share of collective bargaining costs, would be
permissible. 156
Yet any bargaining fee arrangement that distinguishes be-
tween union and nonunion employees in the amount paid to a
union as a condition of employment is also suspect under statutes
granting employees the right to join or not to join unions or
prohibiting employer discriminatory conduct to encourage or dis-
courage union membership. For example, it is possible that a
nonunion employee's pro rata share of bargaining costs might be
more than union dues or fees.' 57 In that case employees would be
induced to join a union in order to save money. Such inducement
appears sufficiently coercive to contravene the employee's right to
refrain from union membership. In addition, because of the
employer's involvement in the underlying bargaining arrangement,
such inducement can be considered discriminatory conduct by the
union and those who will not. For a discussion of the meaning of discrimination under
§ 8(a)(3) of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970)), see Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB,
347 U.S. 17, 39-52 (1954).
"4 See note 34 supra.
'5 See notes 144-52 and accompanying text supra.
'5 Smigel v. Southgate School Dist., 388 Mich. 531, 543, 202 N.W.2d 305, 308 (1972);
New Jersey Turnpike Employees' Local 194 v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 123 N.J. Super.
461, 469, 303 A.2d 599, 604 (1973), aff'd, 64 N.J. 579, 319 A.2d 224 (1974); Town of North
Kingstown v. North Kingstown Teachers Ass'n, 110 R.I. 698, 707, 297 A.2d 432, 436 (1972).
117 This would occur if the union divided the costs of collective bargaining equally
among all employees in the bargaining unit, but chose to charge each nonunion employee
who elected to use a union representative in a grievance procedure with the entire cost of
processing his grievance, while spreading the cost of a union member's grievance over all
union members.
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employer against nonunion members tending to encourage union
membership.
It is more likely, however, that a nonunion employee's share of
the costs of collective bargaining will be less than the amount of
union dues and fees. 1 5 8 If union members are required to pay
union dues and fees as a condition of employment, while nonunion
employees are required to pay the lesser amount equivalent to a
pro rata share of bargaining costs, employees are induced to
refrain from union membership to save money. Again, such in-
ducement appears sufficiently coercive of nonunion membership
to violate statutes granting employees the right to decide whether
or not to join a union. It also involves employer discrimination
against union employees that is very likely to discourage union
membership.
Indeed, the Michigan Court of Appeals, in Smigel v. Southgate
Community School District,159 recognized the strong possibility of
encouragement or discouragement of union membership resulting
from a union security device that differentiates between the
amounts union and nonunion employees must pay a union as a
condition of employment. The court concluded that the only type
of union security agreement permissible under a statute prohibit-
ing employer discriminatory conduct to encourage or discourage
union membership is one that compels all employees in the unit,
union and nonunion alike, to pay a pro rata share of bargaining
costs.1 60 Although that device would eliminate the "free rider," it
158 Union dues are used to finance many activities in addition to the collective bargain-
ing process:
Rather typically, unions use their members' dues to promote legislation .... to
publish newspapers .. .. to finance low cost housing, to aid victims of natural
disasters, to support charities, to finance litigation, to provide scholarships, and to
do those things which the members authorize the union to do in their interest ....
Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963).
159 24 Mich. App. 179, 180 N.W.2d 215 (1970), rev'd, 388 Mich. 531, 202 N.W.2d 305
(1972).
160 In Smigel, the Michigan Court of Appeals was asked to rule on the validity of an
agency shop agreement. The court found that an agency shop agreement is valid only when
the amount of union dues to be paid under the agreement is equivalent to an employee's pro
rata share of the costs of collective bargaining. The court held, however, that it lacked the
factual record necessary to decide whether that essential equivalency existed in the present
case. It therefore reversed and remanded to the trial court, which had sustained the agency
shop agreement, for a hearing to determine what percentage of the fees paid the union
under the agency shop agreement were used to defray the costs of collective bargaining. 24
Mich. App. 179, 180 N.W.2d 215 (1970). The decision of the court of appeals was reversed
by the Michigan Supreme Court, which held that agency shop agreements are invalid on
their face, but without a majority opinion on the issue whether an agreement that requires
all employees in the bargaining unit to pay a pro rata share of collective bargaining costs
would be valid. 388 Mich. 531, 202 N.W.2d 305 (1972).
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may still involve some inducement for an employee to join a union.
When an employee must pay a union a pro rata share of bargain-
ing costs-indeed, when he must pay any money to a union as a
condition of employment-he is induced to join the union, since a
person who must support an organization is likely to wish a voice in
the internal affairs of the organization. That voice is impossible
without union membership. Such inducement, although certainly
less substantial than that existing under other union security de-
vices, might be held to violate statutory provisions giving em-
ployees the right not to join unions or prohibiting employers from
discriminating to encourage union membership.
To so construe those provisions would result in a requirement
that unions elected as exclusive agents represent in a nondis-
criminatory fashion all employees in the bargaining unit, union
and nonunion alike, while denying unions any device for recoup-
ing from nonunion employees a part of the costs of representation.
It is patently unfair to permit employees who wish not to join a
union to benefit from a union's bargaining services, rendered at
some cost, without also permitting some device that will force them
to bear their fair share of the costs. Therefore, provisions granting
employees the right to join or not to join unions or prohibiting
employer discriminatory conduct to encourage or discourage
union membership should be construed to permit union security
devices that require all employees in the bargaining unit to pay a
pro rata share of the costs of collective bargaining as a condition of
employment.
Fair share agreements, however, may be deemed impermissi-
ble under a few state statutes, like those in New York and New
Jersey, that give employees the right not only to refrain from
joining a union, but also the right to refrain from participating in
or assisting a union. 16 1 An agreement requiring an employee to
pay a union for his fair share of bargaining costs as a condition of
employment could be read to contravene the plain meaning of the
words "refrain from participating in" or "assisting" a union. 62
Nevertheless, those words must be construed in conjunction with
the statutory duty imposed on unions to represent all employees in
the unit in a nondiscriminatory fashion. It is inconceivable that a
legislature would impose such a costly duty on unions and also
intend the words "to refrain from participating in or assisting a
161 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 202 (McKinney
1973).
162 See statutes cited note 161 supra.
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union" to grant employees the right to refuse to pay for their fair
share of bargaining costs. Hence fair share agreements should be
found negotiable under public employment laws that grant em-
ployees the right to refrain from participating in or assisting a
union.
Unions, however, contend that the implementation of fair
share agreements imposes an impossible accounting burden on
them. They argue, therefore, that courts should find agency shop
agreements to be within the scope of bargainable subjects unless
expressly prohibited. 63 Although the mechanics of ascertaining
what expenses of a union are attributable solely to the collective
bargaining process involve substantial record-keeping at consider-
able cost to the union, fair share agreements have been successfully
implemented under state public employment laws that expressly
permit no other types of union security agreements. 64
The more fundamental issue, of course, is whether a state
legislature should expressly authorize bargaining not only over fair
share agreements, but also over the closed shop, union shop,
maintenance of membership agreement, and agency shop. The
arguments militating against legislative authorization of the closed
shop, true union shop, and maintenance of membership agree-
ment have been discussed already. 65 Indeed, such arguments
support public employment legislation expressly outlawing those
agreements.
The argument against public employment legislation expressly
authorizing the agency shop is that it is unfair to require employees
who elect not to join a union to support the union beyond their fair
share of bargaining costs. But there are two arguments favoring
legislative authorization of agency shop agreements. First, unions
would have substantial savings in record-keeping costs if all em-
ployees in the bargaining unit were required to pay union dues
and initiation fees. The money saved could be passed on to all
employees in the bargaining unit in the form of lower union dues
and fees. Second, the portion of union dues not devoted to
defraying collective bargaining expenses is often used for nonpolit-
ical purposes that contribute to the general well-being of all
163 Brief for Defendant at 4, Smigel v. Southgate School Dist., 388 Mich. 531, 202
N.W.2d 305 (1972).
"4 See note 12 supra. In Hawaii State Teachers Ass'n, 525 Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP.,
Oct. 15, 1973, at E-l, the Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board determined the
bargaining service fee which nonunion employees had to pay a majority union under a fair
share agreement.
165 See notes 69-77 and accompanying text supra.
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employees. 166 Neither of these reasons, however, provides
sufficient justification for forcing employees who refrain from
union membership to support the union beyond paying for their
fair share of bargaining costs.
VI
TEACHER TENURE AND CIVIL SERVICE ACTS
Even if a union security agreement is found to be within the
statutory scope of bargainable subjects and consistent with all other
provisions of a public employment bargaining law, a court still may
invalidate the agreement for particular classes of public employees.
Any final determination of the legality of a union security agree-
ment under most state public employment laws applicable to all
public employees must be made in the context of civil service and
teacher tenure acts that are applicable only to limited classes of
public employees. These acts, which antedate public employment
bargaining laws, frequently provide that designated classes of pub-
lic employees can be discharged only on specifically enumerated
grounds. 167 Unless the civil service and teacher tenure acts provide
for discharge for failure to abide by a union security agreement, or
unless the public employment bargaining law provides that failure
to abide by a union security agreement constitutes grounds for
discharge under these acts, the courts must decide whether em-
ployees covered by teacher tenure and civil service acts can be
discharged for breaching a union security agreement.When teacher tenure and civil service acts provide for dis-
charge on grounds that cannot be construed to encompass the
breach of a union security agreement, they seem to conflict with
public employment bargaining laws that expressly or impliedly
authorize discharge for the breach of such an agreement. In
resolving the conflict, a court could decide that the public employ-
ment law's authorization of union security agreements for all
public employees impliedly amends the grounds for discharge in
the prior acts and makes the failure to abide by a union security
agreement a ground for discharging the employees covered by the
acts. In contrast, a court could decide that the civil service and
teacher tenure provisions enumerating the grounds for the dis-
166 See note 49 supra.
167 See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.2001 (1968) (dismissal only for reasonable and just
cause); N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw § 75 (McKinney 1973) (dismissal only for misconduct or
incompetency).
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charge of specific classes of public employees are exclusive and
constitute an implied exception to the public employment law's
authorization of union security agreements for all public employ-
ees. Hence, those public employees covered by teacher tenure and
civil service acts could not be discharged for failing to abide by a
union security agreement, even though all other public employees
could be so discharged.
Illustrative of the latter view is an opinion by the Attorney
General of the state of Oregon' 68 issued in response to a request
for a ruling on the validity of a union shop agreement negotiated
for "classified employees"' 169 under the Oregon Public Employes'
Collective Bargaining Act.' 70 That Act authorizes all public em-
ployers to bargain collectively, through representatives of their
own choosing, over "employment relations,"1 7 1 which term the
Attorney General construed to include union shop agreements.
1 72
Oregon also has a civil service law173 that is applicable only to
classified employees. This law enumerates grounds for the dis-
charge of classified employees that could not reasonably be con-
strued to encompass the breach of a union shop agreement.1 74 The
1O8 Op. Arr'y GEN. No. 6449 (Ore. 1968).
'6 ORE. REv. STAT. § 241.215 (1967). That statute requires the board of county
commissioners, in those counties which have enacted civil service legislation, to classify all
positions in the public service of the county. The statute provides:
'The classifications shall be based upon the respective functions of the positions and
the compensation attached thereto, and shall be arranged so as to permit the
grading of positions of like cbaracter in groups and subdivisions, to the end that
like compensation sball be paid for like duties.
Id.
170 Ch. 579, § 4, [19631 Ore. Laws (repealed by ch. 536, § 39, [1973] Ore. Laws).
171 Id.
172 O. ATT'Y GEN., supra note 168, at 522-23. The Oregon Public Employes' Collective
Bargaining Act subsequently was amended to authorize, by express language, agreements
that require union members to pay union dues and nonunion members to pay a pro rata
share of the costs incurred by the union in the collective bargaining process. ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 243.672(c) (1974).
1' ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 241.002-990 (1967).
14 The Oregon civil service law authorizes municipal governments to adopt civil service
rules that regulate the discharge of classified municipal employees and that have the force of
state law once adopted. ORE. REv. STAT. § 241.006 (1967) (enabling clause). Pursuant to the
Civil Service Law, a municipal government adopted the following civil service rules wbich
gave rise to the ruling by the Attorney General:
(1) The tenure of persons subject to civil service sball continue during good
behavior and such persons may be dismissed . . . only for the following causes:
(a) Incompetency, inefficiency or inattention to or dereliction of duty.
(b) Disbonesty, intemperance, drug addiction, immoral conduct, insubor-
dination or discourteous treatment of the public or of fellow employees.
(c) Any other wilful failure of good conduct tending to injure the public
service.
(d) Any wilful violation of the provisions of this Act or the rules or
regulations adopted under this Act.
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Attorney General found that the section of the Bargaining Act
authorizing the discharge of all public employees for the breach of
a union shop agreement 175 conflicted with the civil service law's
provisions for the discharge of classified public employees.1 76 To
resolve the conflict the Attorney General used the rule of statutory
construction that the provisions of a special statute control the
provisions of a general statute in case of conflict.1 77 He then found
the civil service law to be a special statute since it applies only to
classified public employees and the Bargaining Act to be a general
statute since it applies to all public employees. The Attorney
General therefore concluded that the provisions for the discharge
of classified public employees in the civil service law are exclusive
and that classified employees cannot be discharged for the breach
of a union shop agreement.1 78
A Michigan trial court, however, used the same rule of statu-
tory construction to reach the opposite conclusion. In City of Warren
v. Local 1383, Firefighters,1 79 the court was asked for a declaratory
judgment on the validity of an agency shop agreement. The court
was confronted with Michigan's Public Employment Relations Act
(PERA),1 80 which authorizes all public employees to bargain collec-
tively over "wages, hours . . or other conditions of em-
ployment," 18  and with a civil service act18 1 providing for the
discharge of firemen only for neglect of duty, incompetency, and
inefficiency. 18 The court found that agency shop agreements were
within the definition of bargainable subjects under the PERA and
that the PERA's authorization of agency shops conflicted with the
civil service law's provisions for the discharge of firemen. The
court further found the PERA to be special legislation, since it
deals with the "special" situation of public employees who elect to
engage in collective bargaining, and the civil service law to be
general legislation.'The court concluded that, as special legislation,
the PERA's authorization of agency shops prevailed over the civil
(e) Conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.
(f) The wilful giving of false information or withholding information with
intent to deceive, when making application for entrance.
Op. ATT'y GEN., supra note 168, at 523, quoting Columbia County, Ore., Civil Service Act
§ 35.
175 Ch. 579, § 4, [1963] Ore. Laws (repealed by ch. 536, § 39, [1973] Ore. Laws).
176 See note 174 supra.
177 Appleton v. Oregon Iron & Steel Co., 229 Ore. 81, 86, 358 P.2d 260, 262 (1960).
178 Op. ATT'y GEN., supra note 168, at 523-24.
179 68 L.R.R.M. 2977 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1968).
180 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(9) (1968).
181 Id. § 17.455(11).
182 Id. § 5.335 1.
183 Id. §§ 5.3363, 64.
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service law's provisions for the discharge of firemen. Thus, firemen
could be discharged for failing to abide by an agency shop
agreement. '
84
Through the use of a mechanical rule of statutory construc-
tion, the Michigan court and the Oregon Attorney General were
able to resolve the conflict between a public employment law's
authorization of union security and a civil service act's discharge
provision that did not include the breach of a union security
agreement. Unfortunately, the inconsistent results were accom-
plished without any analysis of the reasons why a union security
agreement should or should not be bargainable for employees who
are subject to civil service and teacher tenure acts.
The mere existence of other acts specifying grounds for the
discharge of certain classes of employees does not justify excluding
these employees from a provision of a public employment bargain-
ing law similarly dealing with discharges. The justifications for
legislative and judicial recognition of the principle of union se-
curity arise from the duty that bargaining laws impose on majority
unions to represent all employees, union and nonunion alike, in
the bargaining unit. 8 5 Any justifications for union security agree-
ments that arise from that duty apply in every case where a union
must represent all employees in the bargaining unit regardless of
their union affiliation. When a state legislature places the em-
ployees covered by civil service and teacher tenure acts in the same
category as all other public employees with regard to union rep-
resentation, these employees should be treated in the same manner
as all other public employees in terms of union security agree-
ments. It clearly was not the legislative intent in enacting civil
service and teacher tenure acts that employees so covered be
immune from the effects of union security agreements, since these
acts were passed prior to laws authorizing collective bargaining for
all public employees.18 6
Further, the principle of union security is consistent with the
legislative purposes behind the discharge provisions in civil service
and teacher tenure acts. Those acts were passed to protect em-
ployees from arbitrary action by their public employers 8 7 and to
184 City of Warren v. Local 1383, Firefighters, 68 L.R.R.M. 2977 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1968).
185 See notes 34-36 and accompanying test supra.
186 See W. CARPENTER, supra note 32; M. MosKow, supra note 78; NATIONAL EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH BULLETIN: THE PROBLEM OF TEACHER TENURE (1924); NATIONAL
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, TRENDS IN TEACHER TENURE THRU LEGISLATION AND COURT
DECISION (1957); A. SAGESER, supra note 31.
187 As used here, the term "public employer" refers to the various public agencies that
employ workers within a governmental unit.
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ensure that the government would not lose competent employees
from its service uriless a legitimate public purpose would be served
thereby.' 88 When a state legislature expressly authorizes union
security. agreements for public employees, it necessarily has de-
cided that these agreements serve a legitimate public purpose and
that there is nothing arbitrary in a public employer's discharging
employees for the breach of a union security agreement.
Many public emplbyment bargaining laws are silent on the
issue of union security, although they define the scope of bargain-
able subjects in language that is sufficiently expansive to encompass
all forms of union Security. 189 The Michigan trial court in City of
Warren and the Oregon Attorney General confronted public em-
ployment bargaining laws of that type when they were asked to rule
on the validity of union security agreements negotiated for civil
service employees. A court may find a particular form of union
security to be negotiable solely because it is within the literal
language defining the scope of bargainable subjects in a public
employment law, as did the Michigan court and the Oregon
Attorney General, 19 0 while at the same time believing that this
particular form of union security does not further a legitimate
public purpose. Indeed, although there are ample justifications for
permitting fair share agreements to be negotiable, the justifications
for other forms of union security, particularly the closed shop and
union shop, are more tenuous and the negative aspects more
striking.' After finding one of the more objectionable forms of
union security agreements to be negotiable solely because it is
within the literal language defining the scope of bargainable sub-
jects, a court may wish to limit the applicability of the agreement to
as few employees as possible. Excluding employees covered by the
discharge provisions in civil service and teacher tenure acts facili-
tates that objective. Yet, if a court believes that a particular form of
union security agreement serves no legitimate public purpose, it is
unlikely that the state legislature intended this form of agreement
to be negotiable even though the agreement comes within the
literal language defining the scope of bargainable subjects in a
public employment bargaining law. Hence, the court should place
those objectionable forms of union security outside the scope of
collective bargaining for all public employees and not merely the
188 See sources cited note 18 supra.
189 See notes 14-27 and accompanying text supra.
1,30 See notes 162-83 and accompanying text supra.
"'s See notes 69-77 and accompanying text supra.
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employees covered by discharge provisions in civil service and
teacher tenure acts.
Further, even if a state legislature expressly authorizes bar-
gaining over a particular form of union security agreement, it is
possible that the agreement violates the United States
Constitution.' 92 In that case, of course, the court must find the
agreement invalid for all public employees.
Unlike the civil service discharge provisions that confronted
the Michigan court and the Oregon Attorney General, many civil
service and teacher tenure acts include a ground for discharge that
can be construed to encompass the breach of a union security
agreement. For example, such acts often provide that the em-
ployees they cover can be discharged for "just cause." 193 This is
frequently the case in states with public employment bargaining
laws that authorize union security agreements for all public em-
ployees. In those states, the courts must determine whether the
breach of a union security agreement constitutes "just cause" for
discharging employees under civil service and teacher tenure acts.
That issue was presented to another Michigan trial court in the
Smigel case,' 9 4 where the court was asked to determine the validity
of an agency shop agreement negotiated for public school teachers
covered by Michigan's Teacher Tenure Act. 95 That Act provides
that public school teachers may be discharged only for "reasonable
and just cause."'l96 The agency shop agreement was negotiated
pursuant to Michigan's Public Employment Relations Act,19 7 which
authorizes all public employees to bargain over "wages, hours of
employment or other conditions of employment." 1 98 The court
found that agency shop agreements serve a legitimate public pur-
pose by contributing to stable employer-employee relations and
therefore should be negotiable under the broad definition of
bargainable subjects contained in the PERA. The court further
found that the legislative purpose in enacting the discharge provi-
sions of the teacher tenure act was to protect public school teachers
192 See notes 69-76 and accompanying text supra. Similar provisions of state constitu-
tions would also be relevant.
193 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 31, § 43(a) (1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.2001
(1968).
194 70 L.R.R.M. 2042 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 24 Mich. App. 179,
180 N.W.2d 215 (1970), rev'd on other grounds, 388 Mich. 531, 202 N.W.2d 305 (1972); see
note 160 supra.
1"5 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.1971-.2056 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
196 Id. § 15.2001 (1968).
197 Id. §§ 17.455(1)-(16) (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
1!-8 Id. § 17.455(11).
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from arbitrary action by local school boards. The court concluded
that the public purpose served by agency shop agreements was
entirely consistent with the legislative purpose behind the dis-
charge provisions of the Teacher Tenure Act, and that the failure
of a teacher to abide by an agency shop agreement constituted
"reasonable and just cause" for discharge within the meaning of
the Teacher Tenure Act. 1 9 9
The court's conclusion that public policy supported finding
agency shop agreements negotiable is, at best, arguable.200
Nevertheless, once it is either legislatively or judicially determined
that a particular form of union security serves a legitimate public
purpose and is negotiable under a public employment bargaining
law applicable to all public employees, breach of the agreement
should be held to constitute 'just cause" for discharge under other
acts.
VII
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS
The existence of state public employment bargaining laws
applicable to all public employees may create an additional inter-
pretative problem in states with civil service acts that are applicable
only to selected classes of public employees. Often the state public
employment bargaining law combines a provision that authorizes
union security agreements with another provision to the effect that
nothing in the law is intended to diminish the power of a civil
service commission. 20 1 One function of a civil service commission is
the hearing of appeals from civil service employees who contend
that they have been dismissed contrary to the provisions for dis-
charge enumerated in the civil service act.20 2 The legislatures of a
few states have given the civil service commissions the additional
power to prescribe the grounds on which employees subject to civil
service acts can be discharged. 20 3 It is arguable that to construe an
authorization of union security in a public employment bargaining
law as applicable to civil service employees would diminish the
199 70 L.R.R.M. 2042 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1968). Accord, Warczak v. Board of Educ., 73
L.R.R.M. 2237 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1970).
20 See notes 164-66 and accompanying text supra.
201 See, e.g., note 210 infra.
202 See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 31, § 43(b) (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 11:15-4 (1960);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 240.560 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.203(2) (Supp. 1974).
203 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 11:15-2 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.203(1)
(Supp. 1974).
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power of a civil service commission over the discharge of these
employees. Since the public employment bargaining law specifically
provides that nothing in the law shall diminish the power of the
commission, it can be argued that it was the legislative intent that
civil service employees be excluded from the law's authorization of
union security agreements.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts confronted that
precise argument in Karchmar v. City of Worcester.20 4 The court was
asked to determine the validity of an agency service fee agreement
for classified municipal employees subject to the Massachusetts
Civil Service Law,20 5 which is administered by a civil service com-
mission and provides for the discharge of municipal civil service
(classified) employees for 'just cause. '20 6 The agency service fee
agreement was negotiated under the Massachusetts Municipal Em-
ployees' Bargaining Law,20 7 which expressly applies to all munici-
pal employees, "whether or not in the classified service, ' 208 and
which expressly authorizes agency service fee agreements. 20 9 The
Bargaining Law also provides that "[n]othing in... [the Act] shall
diminish the authority and power of the civil service
commission. 210
The city of Worcester argued that the statement "nothing shall
diminish the authority and power of the civil service commission"
in the Bargaining Law required the court to hold that civil service
employees are not subject to agency service fee agreements. The
court rejected that argument. It found that in enacting the Civil
Service Laws the legislature had not exhausted its power over
civil service employees. Instead, the legislature retained the power
to prescribe rules for the remoal of civil service employees which
it exercised in the Bargaining ! -w by authorizing agency service
fee agreements. Without explaiui~g its analysis, the court con-
cluded that civil service employees are not excluded from legisla-
tive authorization of agency service fee agreements because the
authorization, "even if it [were] treated as giving rise to a just
204 301 N.E.2d 570 (Mass. 1973).
205 MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 31 (1973), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
206 Id. § 43(b) (1973).
ft7 Ch. 763, § 2, [1965) Mass. Acts & Resolves (now MASS. LAws ANN. ch. 150E, § 12
(Supp. 1974)).
208 Ch. 763, § 2, [1965] Mass. Acts & Resolves (now MAss. LAws ANN. ch. 150E, § I
(Supp. 1974)).
209 Ch. 763, § 2, [1965) Mass. Acts & Resolves (now MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 12
(Supp. 1974)).
210 Ch. 763, § 2, [1965] Mass. Acts & Resolves (repealed by ch. 1078, § 1, [1973) Mass.
Acts & Resolves).
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cause' for disciplinary action against a civil service employee ....
did not 'diminish the authority and power of the civil service
commission' " within the meaning of the Bargaining Law. 211
It is unfortunate that the court reached its conclusion without
detailed analysis, but the decision is correct and should be followed
in all cases where a civil service commission's power in relation to
the discharge of civil service employees is limited to ensuring that
discharges conform to statutory grounds. That power is not di-
minished by the legislature's adding a new ground for discharge
either to the civil service law or another law, such as the Mas-
sachusetts Bargaining Law. The commission's power with respect
to employee discharges remains the same-to determine in a
specific discharge situation whether the statutory grounds for dis-
charge have been met. In that context, a provision in a collective
bargaining law protecting the power of a civil service commission
from diminishment should not be construed to exclude civil service
employees from legislative authorization of union security for all
public employees.
Yet when the legislature has granted a civil service commission
the additional power to delineate grounds for the discharge of civil
service employees, there is merit to the argument that the addition
of a new ground for discharge, i.e., union security, by the state
legislature diminishes the power of the commission. The legisla-
ture, by adding a new ground for discharge, has precluded the
commission from prescribing a different rule on the particular
matter. In that sense the power of the commission over the
discharge of civil service employees has been diminished.
Legislative authorization of bargaining over union security,
however, does not require that a union security provision be in-
cluded in a collective bargaining agreement. Instead, it merely
permits the inclusion of a union security provision in the collective
bargaining agreement, 212 which would have the effect of establish-
ing failure to abide by the terms of the union security provision as
a ground for discharging employees covered by the agreement. If
a union security device, to be valid, must be negotiated with the
civil service commission in all cases where civil service employees
are subject to commission regulation of dischargeable offenses, the
211 301 N.E.2d at 576.
2'2 The duty to bargain collectively over a subject does not include the duty to make
concessions while bargaining. See generally Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy,
64 COLUM. L. REv. 248 (1964); Feinsinger, The National Labor Relations Act and Collective
Bargaining, 57 MICH. L. REv. 807 (1959).
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commission's power to promulgate rules governing employees'
discharges is not diminished. A union security device would consti-
tute grounds for the discharge of those civil service employees only
if the commission decided to adopt it in an agreement with the
union. That result, of course, would require construing the words
"public employer" in collective bargaining laws to include a civil
service commission for purposes of bargaining over union security
agreements for civil service employees in cases where the commis-
sion has the power to promulgate discharge rules for these em-
ployees.
The preceding analysis is supported by the history of public
sector collective bargaining laws. Prior to the enactment of laws
authorizing public employee collective bargaining, state legisla-
tures frequently delegated the power to regulate the conditions of
public employment to executive officials and to civil service
commissions. 213 Often the director of a public agency was legisla-
tively granted the power to establish certain basic employment
conditions for agency employees, while a civil service commission
was given the power to establish other conditions for the same
employees, including grounds for discharge. That preexisting
bifurcation of the power to establish working conditions for public
employees created a problem under early public employment laws.
The early collective bargaining laws totally ignored the bifurcation
and merely directed all "public employers" to engage in collective
bargaining with their employees over "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment" without defining who was
the "public employer" for purposes of bargaining over particular
employment conditions. 214
Under those laws, unions often negotiated collective bargain-
ing agreements with agency directors on subjects that under preex-
isting legislative delegations of power had been deemed to be solely
within the control of a civil service commission. 215 Unions justified
213 For a discussion of the diffusion of decision-making authority that exists over the
conditions of public employment in state and local governments, see Blair, supra note 2, at
8-10.
214 Id. at 10-11.
2!' See, e.g., Nagy v. Detroit, 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 52,105, at 66,958 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969).
In Nagy, the court was asked for a declaratory judgment on the validity of an agency shop
agreement between the city of Detroit and a local union representing employees in the
Detroit Civil Service. The Detroit Civil Service Commission was not a party to that
agreement, nor had it participated in the collective bargaining process, although the
Commission bad the power to delineate the grounds for the discharge of civil service
employees under the Michigan Civil Service Law and the Charter of the City of Detroit. See
MiCH. ANN. STAT. §§ 17.455(11), (15) (1968). The agency shop provision was negotiated
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the negotiation of such items with agency directors, rather than
with the civil service commission, by arguing that the "public
employer," for purposes of bargaining over all conditions of em-
ployment, should be the directors of the various employing agen-
cies. Unions further maintained that the collective bargaining law's
definition of bargainable subjects impliedly reallocated the power
over all items coming within this definition from the civil service
commission to the directors of the various employing agencies, as
the "public employer. 216
That was the context in which state legislatures began rede-
signing their collective bargaining laws to ensure that preexisting
delegations of power to civil service commissions over employment
conditions would not be adversely affected by the collective bar-
gaining process. A public employment bargaining law that au-
thorizes union security agreements for all public employees and
also protects the power of civil service commissions from di-
minishment should be construed, therefore, to require that union
security agreements be negotiated directly with a civil service
commission whenever the commission has, under a preexisting
delegation of power, the right to promulgate the grounds on which
civil service employees can be discharged. 217 Under such a con-
struction, the power of the commission to regulate discharges
would not be diminished by legislative authorization of union
security devices, since it would be the commission that would
determine whether or not to adopt a union security device for civil
service employees.
CONCLUSION
There is little question as to which types of union security
agreements for public employees should be considered in the
pursuant to Michigan's Public Employment Relations Act (id. §§ 17.455(l)-(16) (1968), as
amended, (Supp. 1974)), which applies to all public employees, but which fails to define who is
the "public employer" for purposes of collective bargaining. The court found that agency
shop agreements may be negotiated for civil service employees, but
that the only proper and legal agency to conduct such bargaining negotiations... is
the Civil Service Commission of the City of Detroit. Without such participation, as
in the instant case, no valid collective bargaining agreement can be entered into.
60 CCH Lab. Cas. at 66,965.
216 60 CCH Lab. Cas. at 66,961.
217 Even when a public employment bargaining law contains no provision expressly
protecting the powers of the civil service commission from diminishment, it should be so
construed if the commission has the power to delineate grounds for the discharge of civil
service employees. See note 215 supra.
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public interest and which should not. Public policy considerations
overwhelmingly support the authorization of fair share agreements
in public employment bargaining laws that impose a duty on
majority unions to represent all employees .in the bargaining unit,
union and nonunion alike. In contrast, public policy considerations
support legislation prohibiting the closed shop, union shop,
maintenance of membership agreement, and agency shop in the
public sector.
Most state public employment bargaining laws, however, are
silent on the issue of union security. Thus the courts must decide
whether the principle of union security is desirable in the public
sector and, further, whether a particular type of union security is
within the definition of bargainable subjects set forth in public
employment bargaining laws. The resolution of these issues in-
volves a myriad of interpretative problems that could be avoided by
provisions in public employment bargaining laws expressly dealing
with the negotiability or nonnegotiability of the various types of
union security.
Yet even when public employment bargaining laws expressly
authorize particular types of union security, interpretative prob-
lems still will arise in states with civil service and teacher tenure acts
that enumerate the grounds for discharge of certain classes of
public employees, without mentioning the breach of a union se-
curity agreement as a ground. Those interpretative problems also
can be avoided by provisions in public employment bargaining laws
to the effect that the failure to abide by a union security agreement
constitutes grounds for discharge under the other acts. To avoid a
further conflict with civil service acts, state public employment
bargaining laws should provide that union security agreements
must be negotiated with the civil service commission in all cases
where the commission is authorized to promulgate rules governing
the grounds for the discharge of civil service employees.
Until existing public employment bargaining laws are
amended to deal with the problems created by union security
agreements, however, the judiciary will be forced to resolve these
problems. Hopefully, whatever judicial solutions develop will be
based on considerations of public policy, rather than on the mere
application of mechanical rules of statutory construction.
